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WESTERN REiSERVE LAW REVIEW
The Story of Pre-trial in the
Common Pleas Court of
Cuyahoga County
Judge William K. Thomas
I
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRE-TRIAL
IN OUR COMMON PLEAS COURT
In the recently published and extremely valuable "A Judge's Hand-
book of PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE"' under the heading "Pre-trial Ob-
jectives," it-is declared:
The great and ultimate objective of the pre-trial hearing or conference
is to determine what issues are in fundamental dispute and to prepare the
trial judge and counsel on each side for the best possible trial on such
issues....
Neither coerced settlements nor admission of controverted facts are
within the range of its objectives. Only willingly, though perhaps not
spontaneously, admitted undisputed facts are sought, with settlements as a
by-produact. (Emphasis added).
Settlement, not as a by-product, but as the sole goal, was the object
of the Settlement Room conducted by Judge Alva J. Pearson, of our court,
beginning with the April Term of Court in 1932 and continuing until
he left the bench at the end of 1936. He would meet with counsel in
chambers to discuss settlement of cases previously published on a "Settle-
ment List" in the Daily Legal News. His method was later described in
these words:
One of the judges ... operated a settlement room without examination
knowledge or analysis of the issues; it was merely a matter of how much
will you take and how much will you pay. This was not at all scientific
or artistic but was somewhat effective in obtaining settlements.'
It is the composite recollection of lawyers who participated in settle-
ment discussions in Judge Pearson's chambers that in his amiable, cajoling
but patient way he promoted an exchange of propositions and counter
propositions and seldom gave up in the pursuit of a compromise.
The Annual Reports of the court credit Judge Pearson with case dis-
'Hon. Clarence L. Kincaid, A Judge's Handbook of Pre-trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D.
437 (1955).
'Address of Ellis R. Diehm of Cleveland, Pre-trial Procedure as it Affects a Metropol-
ian Area, 13 OHIo ST. BAR Assoc. REP. 460 (1940-1941).
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posals amounting to 1141 in 1932, 1233 in 1933, 1759 in 1934, 2187 in
1935 and 1521 in 1936. Accurate comparison of these figures with case
disposals under the present pre-trial procedure is impossible, since, prior
to 1952, agreed settlement entries could be taken by the lawyers into any
court room. Now all agreed settlement entries not resulting from the
efforts of any particular judge are routed through Room One (the mo-
tion, demurrer, preliminary injuiction, and miscellaneous room of our
court).
Even though it cannot be exactly established how many cases were
disposed of in Judge Pearson's Settlement Room, it is generally agreed
that he well earned his reputation as the "Settler." His settlement con-
ferences-with counsel were of. great value in facilitating the handling of
the civil docket.
In February, 1933, our common pleas court adopted a rule which, with-
out being designated as a pre-trial rule, supplied the substance of real
pre-triaL Worked out by a committee consisting of Judges George P.
Baer, Alva R. Corlett, George B. Harris, Alva J. Pearson and John P.
Dempsey, it specified in part that:
Before being placed on the Active List, actions at law shall be called
by the Chief Justice, or by a Judge designated by him, for the purpose of
assigning each case to the proper calendar if it is to be tried, or proper dis-
position if it is not to be tried. Upon such call the Court in each case shall
determine the condition of the pleadings and the opportunity for settlement
and stipulations... (Emphasis added).
For several weeks Judge John P. Dempsey conducted, as acting Chief
Justice, a "Call Docket" of cases, the published purposes of which docket,
pursuant to the rule just recited, were to determine-
(1) The condition of the pleadings; .
(2) Whether or not the case would be tried;
(3) What if any stipulations may be entered into;
(4) If tried whether non-jury, a jury of 6, or a jury of 12, and
(5) If not to be tried or not ready for trial proper entry to be made.
The fate of this Call Docket is recorded in a notice carried in the
Daily Legal News during the last days of February, 1933, and the early
days of March, 1933. It read:
CALL DOCKET
This call having demonstrated its worth and proven a success will be
continued as a permanent institutioai in connection with the settlements in
Room 8 commencing the week of March 6....
This notice, it later developed, signalled the end of the first efforts
at pre-trial in our common pleas court. Merged into the Settlement Room
operated by Judge Alva J. Pearson in Room 8, the "Call Docket" never
accomplished its announced purposes, and the 1933 rule creating it quick-
ly became a dead letter.
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The events leading up to the adoption of the 1939 Pre-Trial Rule are
worth recounting. One of the speakers at the Ohio State Bar Association
meeting held in Cleveland in May of 1938 was Judge Joseph P. Moynihan
who told about the progress of the Wayne County Michigan Circuit Court
pre-trial procedure. His enthusiastic report convinced one of his listen-
ers, Ellis Diehm of the Cleveland Bar, that a similar system should be
undertaken in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. Fortunately
one of the lawyers whom Ellis Diehm succeeded in interesting in the
possibilities of pre-trial was L. B. Davenport who, in 1939, became Presi-
dent of the Cleveland Bar Association.
President Davenport appointed Ellis Diehm as Chairman of the Ju-
diciary Committee and told him to go ahead with his efforts to get pre-
trial started. As a result, a joint Court Relations Committee of the Cleve-
land Bar Association and the Cuyahoga County Bar Association was or-
ganized. Its work product, with but little change, became the Pre-Trial
Rule adopted by our common pleas court in July 1939. It read:
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
36. All civil cases at any time following thirty days after they are at
issue shall be listed and called for pre-trial at a time to be fixed by the
Court, notice thereof to be given by publication in the Daily Legal News at
least five days prior thereto.
Cases thus listed, called and docketed for pre-trial shall be considered
advanced for that purpose to comply with Gen. Code Sec. 11384.
Counsel in each case shall appear before one or more of the judges to be
designated the pre-trial judge for the purpose of conference, to consider:
(a) The simplification of the issues;
(b) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(c) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof and securing the same;
(d) The limitation of the number of expert and lay witnesses;
(e) The question of settlement;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is had by jury;
(g) To consider the waiving of a jury or in the absence of such
waiver, a trial by less than the regular jury of twelve; and
(h) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
At the pre-trial conference, counsel for the parties shall be prepared to
discuss all phases of their case and shall bring with them the originals or
copies of such exhibits proposed to be offered at the trial as may be needed
at said hearing or as they may request, waiver of proof as to their authen-
tication or stipulation as to their use as exhibits.
A memorandum prepared by the pre-trial judge, considered as an order
of court, reciting the action taken at the conference, the amendments al-
lowed to the pleadings and the agreements made by the parties as to any
of the matters considered, shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.
The pre-trial judge shall have authority under this rule:
(a) Upon motion of either party, the court may render judgment on
the pleadings in the same manner as may now be rendered by the trial
court,
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(b) Upon failure of counsel for the plaintiff to appear, to grant a
dismissal or a non-suit on motion of counsel for the defendant,
(c) Upon failure of counsel for the defendant to appear, to proceed
with the case, allow amendments, fix the number of witnesses, decide all
other preliminary matters, and make such findings as may be proper; and
(d) Upon failure of both counsel to appear, to dismiss the case or
strike the same from the trial list or render such finding, or judgment or
decree as the pleadings alone warrant.
A pre-trial docket, either in permanent or half-sheet form, shall be
prepared for such civil cases.
Stipulations, final entries, and other similar documents files with the
Clerk must be entered upon the regular docket as filed, as well as upon the
pre-trial docket.
Entries having to do with pre-trial procedure alone shall only be re-
quired to be entered upon the pre-trial docket.
During the operation of pre-trial from its inception in September,
1939, through April, 1953, the judges handling the pre-trial hearings
changed, but the procedure followed by each did not basically vary. The
pre-trial conference occurred at the judge's bench with only counsel re-
quired to be present. The scheduling varied with the judge. Judge
Corlett in September, 1939, heard 13 cases in the morning and 10 in the
afternoon, but by December had increased the total to 20 in the morning
and 20 in the afternoon. Judge McMahon, during the same period, heard
14 in the morning and 12 in the afternoon in September, 1939, and in
December he heard 12 in the morning and 12 in the afternoon. In Sep-
tember, 1942, Judge Powell heard 12 in the morning, and Judge McMahon
in the same month heard six in the morning and six in the afternoon. In
September, 1945, Judge Powell was following the same schedule. In 1950
when Judge Newcomb first went on pre-trial, he set five for each half
hour - 20 in the morning and 10 in the afternoon.
The judge would ask counsel from the bench a series of questions.
Are there any amendments to the pleadings? Any depositions to be taken,
or medical examinations to be held? Any stipulations? Or, as Judge
Powell used to put it "Any stips?" Can this case be settled?
If there seemed any interest in the latter question, the judge might
follow it up, or pass the case for further pre-trial to permit settlement
discussion in the meantime.
Finally he would ask if the parties would waive a jury, or agree to a
jury of eight, six, or four. If there were companion cases he might order
the cases to be tried at the same time.
Pre-trial from September of 1939 through 1952 may be pictured by
means of a table which was prepared from annual reports of the court.
(See Appendix B, page 410).
An examination of this table suggests several conclusions. The largest
total of dispositions from 1939 through 1952 achieved in the pre-trial of
civil cases was 1099 which occurred in 1942. However, the total of 799
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dispositions accomplished in the first term of pre-trial, i.e., the Septem-
ber term of 1939, undoubtedly is the high figure for any one term of
court, throughout the history of pre-trial in our court.
The maximum number of stipulations was 1,000, obtained in 1942,
followed by 818 in 1943, although the reports do not indicate the nature
or character of the stipulations reached. In the other years the stipula-
tions totalled less than 50 in the years 1939, 1940, 1945, 1946, 1948, be-
tween 50 and 60 in the years 1947, 1949, 1950, and reached 70 in 1951,
147 in 1944 and 343 in 1941.
Worth recording is the large number of jury waivers and reduced
juries which resulted from pre-trial hearings during this period. High
points in this respect were reached in the following years. In 1942 there
were 293 jury waivers, 1,175 jury of eight consents, 73 jury of six con-
sents and 16 jury of four consents, while demands for juries of 12 were
made in only 358 cases. In 1941 there were 211 jury waivers, 1,296 jury
of eight consents, 72 jury of six consents, while demands for juries of 12
were made in 604 cases. In 1947 there were 165 jury waivers, 1,300 jury
of eight consents, five juries of six and four consents, while in 585 cases
juries of 12 were demanded. In 1949 jury waivers amounted to 177,
there were 1,044 jury of eight consents and juries of 12 were demanded
in 938 cases. Even as late as 1951 jury waivers and reduced juries ex-
ceeded jury demands of 12.
In 1951, 1952, and until his death on April 28th, 1953, Judge Adrian
G. Newcomb presided in pre-trial His belief in substantial justice,
forged in the heat of many court room contests in which he participated
first as a trial lawyer and then as a trial judge, made him a staunch and
enthusiastic advocate of pre-trial. Conceiving the function of pre-trial
principally as a medium of settling lawsuits, he pointed his pre-trials
from the very beginning in the direction of settlement.
The pre-trial procedure used by Judge Newcomb was well described
in May 1953 for the Judicial Council of California by Judge Clarence L.
Kincaid of the Superior Court of Los Angeles, California.3 Referring to
a pre-trial of Judge Newcomb's which he witnessed in November, 1952,
Judge Kincaid says:
About eight cases are set for each half hour and are published in the
legal journal. He is liberal as to continuances, but a strict policy is fol-
lowed once the case is set foi trial.
He conducts the hearings in open court without a reporter but infor-
mally. Counsel quickly discuss relative claims, and matter of settlement is
the first order of business. If possibility is indicated the hearing may be
put over several times until agreements or impasse reached. If trial seems
necessary effort is made to narrow the issues and obtain stipulations. These
u KiNcAID, A STUDY OF PRE-TRIAL USAGE IN NINE AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES.
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are entered by the judge on a prepared form and signed by him. Effort
is made to hold trial within three or four weeks but often more cases are
pre-tried than the trial courts can absorb, so several weeks are passed before
another pre-trial calendar is published.
Looking backward it is evident that the thoroughgoing pre-trial pro-
cedure, instituted in July of 1953, had several proximate causes.
Clearly one important factor was the thinking of the lawyers that
though much had been achieved by pre-trial in Cuyahoga County Com-
mon Pleas Court, more could be accomplished if adequate time were al-
lowed for each pre-trial. This viewpoint was expressed by the joint
Common Pleas Court Relations Committee of the Cleveland and Cuya-
hoga County Bar Associations in the summer of 1952. Rep6rting on
July 29, 1952, to Judge Arthur H. Day, Chairman of the committee,
'Chairman Burns Weston speaking for the Lawyer's Committee wrote in
part as follows:
B. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
It is the unanimous opinion of your sub-committee that Judge New-
comb has done outstanding work in handling the pre-trial docket. Many
settlements have been brought about under his guidance. Indeed his very
success leads to the following recommendations:
1. That two or three judges be designated to conduct pre-trial hear-
ings and that lawyers be afforded an opportunity for a pre-trial within 4-6
months after the issues have been made up. In order to accomplish this,
it is believed that the assignment of more judges will be of direct assistance,
but in addition it is recommended that each of the judges be given more
time for the pre-trial hearing of a given case and that any lawyer, with the
consent of opposing counsel, be permitted upon motion to have a case set
down spedally before the pre-trial judge at any time that said lawyers
desire.
2. To pick at random the pre-trial docket for June 4, 1952, we find
that 42 cases were assigned for hearing within a period of 2-1/2 hours,
or approximately 3-1/3 minutes per case. Obviously, such does not give
adequate time for full consideration of settlement possibilities and any
other matter regarding pleadings or stipulations, etc. Unquestionably,
more cases could be settled, thus eliminating the need for time consuming
trials if more emphasis were devoted to this aspect of the pre-trial pro-
cedure, providing of course that more judges are assigned and each judge
is given more time for each case.
In this same connection, it is xecommended that the pre-trial judges be
given authority to dismiss any action called for pre-trial hearing where
counsel for the plaintiff does not appear or where counsel for defendant
fails to appear to have the case advanced for hearing.
•The second significant factor in bringing about the 1953 reform of
pre-trial procedure in civil cases was the pioneering of Judge Arthur H.
Day, as presiding Judge of Domestic Relations in the 1953 January term,
at which term he devised and successfully carried out mass pre-trials in
contested divorce and alimony cases. The foundation of his system was
the required presence of the parties at each pre-trial.
With the wide acceptance of this precedent of compulsory appearance
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of the parties at divorce pre-trials, it became much easier later in 1953 to
incorporate into civil pre-trials the indispensable principle of compulsory
attendance of the parties.
The final factor was the necessity of reviewing our pre-trial procedure
following the unexpected death of Judge Adrian G. Newcomb, our pre-
siding pre-trial judge, who passed away on April 28, 1953.
Assigned the task of resuming pre-trial was the writer, who, as Com-
mon Pleas Judge of Geauga County from June of 1950 until the end of
1952, had learned at first hand that thoroughgoing pre-trial was both
workable and beneficial.
On May 15, 1953, the following letter was sent by the writer to Burns
Weston, then Chairman of the Joint Docket Committee of the Cleveland
and Cuyahoga County Bar Associations (also known as the Joint Court
Relations Committee.)
S. Burns Weston,
Attorney at Law,
Terminal Tower,
Cleveland, Ohio.
Dear Burns:
At next Thursday's meeting of the Common Pleas Docket Joint Com-
mittee of the Cleveland and Cuyahoga County Bar Associations, would you
as Chairman bring up for consideration the following proposal relating to
pre-trials?
This letter is being written to you as Chairman of such Committee at
the suggestion of Judge Arthur H. Day, Chairman of the opposite Judges'
Committee, and after consultation with Chief Justice Kramer.
Judge Newcomb's loss is greatly felt by bench and bar, but nowhere
more keenly than in the fact that his untimely going has caused the im-
mediate cessation of pre-trials. Under his experienced hand our pre-trial
system has advanced and demonstrated that it can produce beneficial results.
Yet the progress so far made may easily be lost if the resumption of pre-
trials is deferred too long.
However, it now appears that in all probability pre-trials cannot be
scheduled during the present term of court because it is necessary that all
available judges devote their full court time to trial work.
To meet this emergency I am proposing to undertake the holding of a
pre-trial docket for four weeks beginning July 6th, 1953, with the week of
August 3rd saved to take up the slack on the first four weeks.
One of the important prerequisites to the success of the pre-trial system
is genuine cooperation between Bench and Bar. I am therefore glad to
accept the privilege of meeting with you and your joint committee to
frankly discuss the feasibility and form of such a summer pre-trial docket.
The proposed procedure at such pre-trials would be as follows:
1. One hour to be set aside for each pre-trial with six cases being
scheduled each date at 9:15 A. M., 10:15 A. M., 11:15 A. M., 1:30 P. M.,
2:30 P. M., and 3:30 P. M.
2. Each pre-trial to take up the following subjects in the order named.
(a) Each side to succinctly state the factual issues and questions
of law, to be followed by full and frank discussion thereof and the
greatest possible narrowing of the points that divide the parties.
(September
"PRE-TRIAI - A SYMPOSIUM'
(b) To the extent possible, facts to be stipulated and exhibits to
be identified and authenticated.
(c) Questions relating to amendments to the pleadings, discov-
ery of evidence, physical examinations of parties and/or premises,
and matters of similar nature to be resolved.
(d) Candid exchange and evaluation of propositions of com-
promise.
(e) Pre-trials to be held informally with the court either in cham-
bers or at the trial table. Clients to be present but to participate
only as needed.
(f) If necessary the case will be continued for further pre-trial at
specified time. If a further pre-trial is not justified then the case
will be placed on September term active list, and waiver or size
of jury to be determined....
The planning meeting took place as scheduled. Approval of the pre-
trial experiment for July, 1953, by the Joint Docket Committee, and by the
Cleveland and Cuyahoga County Bar Associations is reported by Chair-
man Weston to Chief Justice Kramer on the eve of the May meeting of
the judges in his letter of May 28, 1953.
Dear Judge Kramer:
You will recall that I discussed with you the support of the individual
members of our joint committee, representing both Bar Associations, fol-
lowing our meeting last week with Judge Thomas in regard to a proposed
pre-trial program for the month of July. Subsequently I forwarded you a
copy of my letter of I-. Walter Stewart, President of the Cleveland Bar
Association.
I wish at this time to advise that both the Cleveland Bar Association
and the Cuyahoga County Bar Association have approved the recommen-
dation of our joint committee of the two associations with reference to the
proposed pre-trial suggestions to be conducted during the month of July.
I have discussed the proposed pre-trial suggestions with several lawyers.
I have yet to find any one who opposed the recommendation. I am con-
vinced that the experiment during the month of July will be so successful
that it will serve as a basis for continued pre-trial along the same lines be-
ginning with the September Term. Our experience in July can assist us in
determining whether there are any additions or amendments to be made in
the procedure that has developed.
On behalf of our joint committee I want to take this occasion to express
to you and all of the judges of the Common Pleas Court our most sincere
appreciation for the opportunity that this joint committee offers to meet
and work out with the judges problems of common interest.
Most Cordially,
s/ S. Burns Weston.
At the meeting of our common pleas judges held on May 29, 1953,
the proposed pre-trial experiment for the month of July, 1953, was unani-
mously endorsed and adopted.
To inform litigants and counsel of the new requirement of compul-
sory attendance of the parties at pre-trial, and to explain that adequate
time would be allotted at each pre-trial, the following notice was pub-
lished in the Daily Legal News and generally circulated.
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PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE-ROOM 13
Pre-trials will be held in July and resumed in September. Cases to be
pre-tried are those first to be reached for trial. An amount of time has
been assigned to pre-trial which will permit the pre-trial procedure out-
lined in Court Rule 36 to be observed, and which will endeavor to ac-
complish the following objects:
1. A full and frank discussion of the issues looking to the maximum
narrowing of the area that divides the parties.
2. Written stipulations concerning pleadings, evidence, exhibits, ex-
aminations and trial procedure.
3. Complete canvassing of the chance of compromise or settlement.
Ordinarily the first step at pre-trial will be a conference in chambers
of counsel and court. Thereafter as necessary there will be separate con-
sultations with each counsel.
Clients are requ'red to be present in court. In addition to thus giving
a client the feel of the court room, it is anticipated that in the course of
each pre-trial there may be joint conferences involving all clients and coun-
sel, and there may be separate meetings with each side.
Statements by counsel or clients at pre-trial are not binding in any later
stage of the case unless expressly made so by written stipulation at pre-trial.
Pre-trials are being held in the firm belief that an adequate and
thorough pre-trial procedure will aid litigants, counsel and the court in
improving and accelerating the administration of justice. One concrete way
to shorten protracted delay between filing and final disposition of civil ac-
tions is to enlarge justice by consent and reduce the necessity for judgment
by command. If all will cooperate each will benefit.
NOTICE TO ATTORNEYS
The following cases have been assigned to the above room on the dates
and time indicated.
Disposition of matters to be taken up at pre-trial within the allotted
time requires counsel and client to be present promptly at the hour indi-
cated without further notice.
William K. Thomas, J.
Court of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
The reaction to the new thoroughgoing type of pre-trial employed
during July of 1953 and plans to extend its use is reflected in a memoran-
dum of September 23, 1953, from Chairman Burns Weston, to Judge
Arthur H. Day, Chairman of the Joint Docket Committee and its mem-
bers (Judges Samuel H. Silbert and Felix T. Matia, and Attorneys A. H.
Dudnik, Claude E. Clarke, William J. Corrigan, William K Gardner and
Claybourne George).
Judge Kramer had conferred with the writer and requested that our
committee consider how to increase the number of cases to be pre-tried
under the procedure carried out during July and being used at the present
time by Judge William K. Thomas. Both last Friday and at a previous
meeting of our committee on August 4 all of the lawyers have been en-
thusiastic about the present pre-trial program. Last Friday the committee
requested Judge Thomas to prepare his recommendations for revision of
the Rules of Court with reference to pre-trial and Judge Thomas has kindly
consented to do so. When his recommendations are available, we suggest a
meeting of our entire committee, that is the six lawyers and Judges Day,
Silbert and Matia.
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The splendid results accomplished by Judge Day in Divorce Court
during the last term demonstrated the importance of thoroughness in a
pre-trial hearing and the importance of having clients present. With Judge
Day's experience in mind, Judge Thomas likewise has found that the ef-
fectiveness of a pre-trial hearing requires thoroughness and the presence
of clients. The experience to date indicates that under this procedure one
judge cannot average more than four cases per day. This means that a
sufficient backlog of pre-tried, cases cannot be built up to supply enough
cases for assignment. At our meeting last week we decided to ask Chief
Justice Kramer to assign another judge to pre-trial work after the pre-trial
rules have been revised. Perhaps the addition of another judge will not
build up immediately a sufficient backlog but the committee is of the
opinion that it is much better to make haste slowly. If it becomes impos-
sible for all cases to be pre-tried before trial in the thorough manner now
being accomplished, it is the opinion of the committee that rather than to
revert to the old method of pre-trial, it is better that cases be assigned for
trial and then as much pre-trial accomplished as possible by the judge to
whom the case is assigned for trial. However, it is felt that this should not
prevent any lawyers from requesting that their cases be assigned for the
regular pre-trial before Judge Thomas. Some lawyers already have made
such requests.
In time both of the recommendations of the Committee were met
A revised Pre-Trial Rule consistent with the new pre-trial procedure
was subsequently adopted by our common pleas judges on March 5th,
1954. It provides:
PROCEDURE AT PRE-TRIAL HEARINGS
RULE 36
1. In chronological order unless the furtherance of justice and special
circumstances justify a case being heard out of order as many civil cases as
possible shall be pre-tried at scheduled times, notice of which hearings shall
be given by publication in the Daily Legal News at least five days prior
thereto.
2. At each pre-trial the parties and their counsel shall appear. If the
party is a corporation it may appear by an officer, or by an employee hav-
ing knowledge of the subject matter of the case. If the party is insured
concerning the claims of the case he may appear by a claims employee of
his insurance company.
If the party is unable to appear by reason of illness, injury, physical
disability, residence outside of the state, or for other good cause shown
his presence may be excused unless found to be necessary.
3. The spirit and purpose of pre-trials is to enlarge justice by consent
and to reduce the need for judgment by command. Accordingly pre-trials
shall employ the conference method, with sufficient time allotted to ac-
complish the following objects.
(a) a full and frank discussion of the issues looking to the maxi-
mum narrowing of any controversy dividing the parties;
(b) written stipulations concerning pleadings, evidence, exhibits,
examinations, the issues and procedure of the trial;
(c) complete exploration of the possibilities of terminating the
litigation;
(d) such other matters as may aid in the furtherance of justice
and the disposition of the case.
4. The pre-trial judge shall have authority under this rule:
(a) to render judgment on the pleadings; to allow amend-
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ments to the pleadings; to decide any preliminary matter; to
record any admissions, stipulations, or agreements; to hear
and determine the case with the consent of the parties; to
advance the case for immediate trial; and to make whatever
findings orders, judgments or decrees are warranted and
proper under the circumstances, and within the spirit and
scope of this rule;
(b) if either or all of the parties and their counsel fail to appear
at a duly publicized pre-trial the court may dismiss the case
or take any other action authorized by sub-paragraph 4 (a).
5. Statements of the parties or their counsel made in the course of the
pre-trial hearing shall not be binding upon the parties unless expressly
made so by written stipulation at pre-trial.
6. A memorandum prepared by the pre-trial judge, reciting any
amendments allowed to the pleadings, any admissions, stipulations or agree-
ments, and whatever action was taken or whatever orders, judgments or
decrees were made at the pre-trial hearing shall be entered as an order of
the court, shall be duly docketed, and shall control the subsequent course
of the case unless subsequently modified to prevent manifest injustice.
7. Cases called for pre-trial shall be deemed advanced for that purpose
under Revised Code 2311.07.
Adopted by Common Pleas Judges, March 5, 1954.
As indicated in the memorandum of September 23, 1953, the expe-
rience of the summer pre-trial experiment demonstrated that if each case
received thorough treatment only four cases could be pre-tried in the
course of a day. It was not found feasible to schedule six cases a day as
originally contemplated in May of 1953.
Resuming the hearing of pre-trials in September, 1953, the writer con-
tinued as the sole pre-trial judge until the beginning of the April 1953
term of court, when he was joined by Judge Felix T. Matia.
We are now approaching the end of the third year in which thorough-
going pre-trial has been attempted in our common pleas court. As of
April 1, 1956, ten judges of our court (total bench- 15) and two non-
resident judges have served as pre-trial judges. Together with the length
of their pre-trial service these judges are:
William K. Thomas - 22 months
Felix T. Matia - 14 months
Joseph H. Silbert - 11 months
Earl R. Hoover - 11 months
Daniel H. Wasserman - 8 months
Charles W. White - 5 months
John J. Mahon - 2 months
Benjamin D. Nicola - 2 months
Harry A. Hanna - 1 month
Donald F. Lybarger - 1 month
Eugene McNeill - 4 months (Van Wert County)
Charles Lynch - 2 months (Wood County)
1954 and 1955 is visualized in the table found in Appendix C, page 411.
The progress of thoroughgoing pre-trial since its inception in July
of 1953 in relation to the entire civil docket for the years 1952, 1953,
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A study of the table prompts these major conclusions.
1) In 1954, the first full year under the new thoroughgoing pre-
trial procedure, total dispositions were 970, which was more than twice
the total dispositions of 447 in 1952, the last full year under the old
"quickie" pre-trial procedure. In 1955, total dispositions were 1,795, a
gain of about 80 per cent over 1954's total. Moreover the total of 1,795
dispositions for 1955 was 60 per cent higher than the previous peak of
1,099 dispositions attained in the pre-trial rooms in 1942.
2) Comparing the settlements of the pre-trial judges with the settle-
ments in trial rooms the ratio is very illuminating. In 1952 settle-
ments by the pre-trial judge totalled 447 while settlements in the trial
rooms amounted to 713. In 1954, the first full year of the new pre-trial
system, settlements in the trial rooms were 285 while settlements in the
pre-trial rooms reached 876. (Actually, if settlements by agreed judg-
ments and verdicts were added, the total would be 970). Last year
(1955) settlements in the trial rooms fell to 210, while settlements in-
creased to 1,593 in the pre-trial rooms. (Again if agreed judgments and
verdicts are included, the total would be 1795).
These figures indicate a significant shift of settlements from the trial
room to the pre-trial room. Advancement of settlements to the pre-
trial room saves the time and expense of doctors and other witnesses, who
are called to the trial but don't testify, of lawyers expending much time
and energy in last minute preparation for a trial and of the parties get-
ting set for a trial that does not take place.
3) While the number of final dispositions resulting from pre-trial
has steadily increased during the years 1952 through 1955, civil case fil-
ings (not counting divorce and alimony cases) have also risen, going
from 4,570 in 1952 to 6,039 in 1955. During the same period pending
cases totaled 7,252 on January 1, 1952, and 7,888 on January 3, 1956.
Thus the filings in 1955 were 1,400 greater than in 1952, while the back-
log of pending civil cases at the beginning of 1956 exceeds the backlog
at the beginning of 1952 by 632.
As of April 20, 1956, clvil cases being heard in the regular order,
without advancement by reason of statutory cause, are being tried sub-
stantially 28 months subsequent to filing date.
It has become evident that effective pre-trial procedure cannot alone
solve the long perplexing problem of our lagging civil docket.
Currently four judges are assigned to the criminal branch of our
court, one judge is assigned to the civil motion, demurrer and interloc-
utory room, two judges are assigned to pre-trial, two judges devote full
time to domestic relations cases, and the Chief Justice hears domestic rela-
tions matters when he is not carrying out his many other duties. The five
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remaining judges are available for the trial of civil cases and those contested
divorce cases which are not heard by the judges assigned to domestic rela-
tions. Undoubtediy substantial help in cutting down our back log should
be afforded by the four new judges who will be elected this fall and will
take office in January 1957.
II
ESSENTIALS OF OUR PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
A PRELIMINARY NOTE
Recently our judges at a regular meeting were discussing the state of
pre-trial in our court. Judge Edward Blythin, currently assigned to civil
trials, said that he could not understand why he found no stipulations in
any of the cases that had come to his room for trial. Judge Daniel H.
Wasserman, now in pre-trial, responded that stipulations were being ob-
tained in many cases, but he had noticed that usually the cases in which
stipulations were obtained were cases disposed of at the later settlement
stage of the pre-trial. A discussion ensued concerning steps towards se-
curing more stipulations. Judge Joseph A. Artl noted that the recently
devised pre-trial check sheet (which will be presented later) indicated
that the Pre-Trial Committee recognized the need for increasing the num-
ber of stipulations. Some of the judges raised the question whether, after
all, settlements and not stipulations were the real objective of pre-trial.
Judge Felix T. Matia and Judge Joseph H. Silbert noted the great in-
crease of settlements under the new pre-trial methods. Judge Arthur H.
Day declared that pre-trial settlement discussions often brought about
settlements when the cases reached his trial room. The final comment
came from Judge Parker Fulton who told how he had recently achieved
stipulations of such magnitude that the trial time in the case was reduced
to two hours. He added "Some pitchers throw with their right arms,
some with their left -some with one motion, and some with another; so
likewise no two judges will conduct a pre-trial exactly the same way."
Experience in our court -in which ten of the fifteen judges and two
non-resident judges have conducted pre-trials- confirms this last opin-
ion that no two judges pre-try a case in exactly the same way. Expe-
rience furthermore indicates that not every judge likes or is suited for
pre-trial, although he may be eminently qualified to perform trial work.
Nevertheless it is important to have fundamental uniformity in the
essential elements of each pre-trial irrespective of the pre-trial judge. It
is these essentials which will now be analyzed.
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THE FIRST ESSENTIAL - THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTIES
"At each pre-tral the parties and their counsel shall appear"
- (Pre-Trial Rule).
A pre-trial involved an action of a husband and a wife against a munici-
pality for damage to their land resulting from cleaning out a -drainage
ditch. When asked to describe the condition the wife vehemently pro-
tested to the officials of the village concerning what she regarded as arbi-
trary and needless destruction and damage. to a wooded picnic area ad-
joining the ditch. Her counsel later reported that his client told him that
the pre-trial gave her her day in court, and if a, settlement could be
worked out she would be satisfied. Eventually one was.
The consummation of the desire of some litigants to have their day
in court is only one of several reasons that have corroborated the wisdom
of a rule requiring the presence of parties at a pre-trial. Furthermore
with the parties present, as questions of fact are considered, many uncer
tamties can be dispelled; and counsel need not delay to another day a de-
cision as to whether a point can be stipulated. It has been found too that
there is a certain sobering therapy in hearing the other side's description
and evaluation of the facts which it is claimed will be proved. Some-
times a litigant and even his counsel, entirely certain of the complete jus-
tice of their side of the case at the beginning of the pre-trial have their
eyes and ears opened by a revelation of the position of the other party.
Whether or not the case is settled, it is likely that by reason of tie
knowledge gained at pre-trial, it will be tried better on both sides -thus
serving and furthering the true cause of justice.
Of course, sometimes a pre-trial reveals to a client that his counsel is
not very well prepared. A case is recalled in which the client told his
unbelieving lawyer that certain signed statements of witnesses were in
the lawyer's file. The client said he knew because he got them and
turned them over to the lawyer. Finally the lawyer, a bit shamefaced,
fished out the statements from his slipshod file. The statements helped
produce a satisfactory settlement.
On the other hand a lawyer who presents his case well at pre-trial
demonstrates that he has prepared his case to the hilt and makes it dear
that he has worked hard on his dient's behalf. Counsel have several
times remarked that the pre-trial helped show their clients that counsel
had earned their fees.
Perhaps the presence of the parties has contributed most in furthering
settlements. Pictures flash through the mind of the sight of a wasted
thigh, of an osteomyelitic lesion of the shin bone, of a little girls loss of
an eye, of a grossly thickened ankle, of a widow in a wrongful death ac-
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tion sweet enough to make her appealing to a jury but not so strikingly
beautiful that the jury would assume that she was likely soon to remarry.
It is the plaintiff who is the chief exhibit in a personal injury action. In
evaluating a lawsuit there is no substitute for an opportunity for the man
with the checkbook to see the plaintiff, to hear him talk, to view any
residual effects of the injury. The sight of the plaintiff at pre-trial has
caused many claims men to realistically re-evaluate their figures upward,
thus making settlements possible.
On the other hand, certain plaintiffs, because of lack of experience in
evaluating a case, or because of understandable self-interest, often make
entirely unrealistic demands. Almost countless are the occasions when
counsel have said, "Judge will you explain to my client that this case
might be lost, I think the insurance company's offer is not out of line but
I can't get my client to see that." Thereupon the court has talked with
client and counsel, merely to acquaint the client with the unpredictabil-
ity of the jury, the uncertainties of appeal and the other facts of life of
every lawsuit. Invariably the client is told that when it is all said and
done the decision is one which only the client can make. Though the
judge may only be repeating what counsel has already told the client,
either because of repetition or because the judge's word is added to that
of counsel, settlements have resulted.
However it is not only in personal injury actions that the presence of
the parties has proved invaluable. In contract actions, in property dis-
putes, in every kind of civil action between private citizens- their pres-
ence is usually valuable and often indispensable in helping to clarify the
real issues of the case, in working out stipulations and in achieving settle-
ments.
"If the party is insured concerning the claims of the case he may appear
by a claims employee of his insurance company."
The purpose of this further provision of our pre-trial rule will be
explained.
It is recognized that though the casualty insurer in a personal injury
or property damage case is the real party in interest it is not and may
never become an actual party to the action.
The insurer's appearance at the pre-trial therefore cannot be com-
pelled at this stage of the case, as this writer understands the law. Yet
the presence at the pre-trial of the claims man is of great value (1) in
discussing the issues because of his knowledge of the accident acquired
through the insurer's investigation and (2) because the man with the
checkbook is important to have around when the subject of settlement is
reached.
The option of permitting the substitution of a claims man for the
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actual defendant is intended to authorize the appearance at pre-trial of a
representative of the casualty insurer, and to encourage its participation
in the pre-trial. Some counsel who normally represent plaintiffs have
expressed objection to allowing this option. It seems relevant to observe
at this point that there are still a few insurance companies which do not
take advantage of their right to attend the pre-trial in place of the de-
fendant. Some of these do not because they have no Cleveland repre-
sentative. However, whatever the reason, it has been repeatedly true that
in these cases where the actual defendant appears rather than his insurer
the percentage of settlements has been less than where the claims man
comes to the pre-trial.
Furthermore, should the defendant's appearance be essential, for ex-
ample, on a question of fact, or to protect his uninsured interest, the pre-
trial judge is empowered to insist on the presence of the actual defendant
where "found to be necessary." This authority is expressly given by a
further provision of the pre-trial rule which states that
"If the party is unable to appear by reason of illness, injury, physical
disability, residence outside of the state, or for other good cause shown his
presence may be excused unless found to be necessary."
THE SECOND ESSENTIAL - THE INFORMAL CONFERENCE
Ordinarily pre-trials are scheduled at 9:15, 10:45, 1:30 and 3:00, each
lasting about an hour and a half.
The pre-trial is an informal conference in two parts. The first part
involves a full and frank discussion of the issues of law and fact, in each
case carried on with the parties and counsel present and participating.
This portion of the pre-trial is usually conducted in the court's chambers
but with the doors open. It has been found that tensions and antago-
nisms often present in a legal contest are lessened in the more informal
surroundings of the judge's roon It is not a formal hearing and no
stenographic record is kept of the proceedings. In fact the actual pre-
trial heretofore reported is the first recorded pre-trial in our court. This
first part of the pre-trial also may be held around the trial table in the
court room but under the same informal conditions.
To insure the greatest exchange of ideas and information our pre-trial
rule provides,
"Statements of the parties or their counsel made in the course of the
pre-trial hearing shall not be binding upon the parties unless expressly
made so by written stipulation at pre-trial."
Late use of the knowledge gained at pre-trial is not precluded. But the
above prohibition contemplates that in any subsequent formal proceed-
ings reference shall not be made in words or substance to statements made
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at pre-trial by parties or their counsel. Such statements, being made in a
conference which may lead to settlement, are deemed privileged and con-
ditional admissions.
Newspaper reporters are welcome to listen in on the discussion of the
issues in the first part of the pre-trial. However, since only written stipu-
lations of statements made by counsel or by the litigants are binding at a
later stage of the case, oral statements made in the course of the pre-
trial are deemed privileged from publication. If this were not the rule,
the voluntary exchange of ideas and information, so necessary to a suc-
cessful pre-trial, would undoubtedly decrease and perhaps cease altogether.
The second part of the pre-trial is devoted to settlement negotiations.
Trial and error experimentation has demonstrated that there is greater
likelihood of achieving compromise or other disposition if the court
probes the possibility separately and privately with each side. Manifestly
if such separate discussions were attended by a third person, free to reveal
the settlement negotiations which he hears, the necessary ingredient of
confidential communication would disappear.
A year ago a newspaper questioned the pre-trial practice of regarding
the terms of any settlement reached in pre-trial as not subject to com-
pulsory disclosure. After full consideration of the question, the judges
of our court adopted the general policy that since pre-trial settlements are
a matter of private voluntary agreement between the parties, neither the
amount nor the terms of a pre-trial settlement of a civil case should be
made public if the parties object to the disclosure. In actual practice,
however, it has been discovered that the parties usually do not oppose a
release of the result except where it might adversely affect other pending
litigation.
THE THIRD ESSENTIAL - THE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
The first part of the pre-trial is a general conference of parties, coun-
sel, and the court. For each general conference there should be a planned
order of discussion. The order of discussion may vary according to the
nature of the case, and will undoubtedly differ with each pre-trial judge.
Nevertheless the fundamental objects of every pre-trial general confer-
ence remain the same. They are (1) to achieve the largest area of factual
agreement, (2) to require each side, in the presence of the other side, to
explain its position on the issues of the case and (3) to resolve any un-
determined question necessary to ready the case for trial.
Throughout the general conference the court uses the question method.
He attempts to develop the viewpoints of the parties on all points of
possible relevance. He assumes that the case is going to be tried, and
since he is pre-trying the case, rather than trying it, he avoids giving any
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fixed 6r final viewpoints of his own. A good way to initiate the discus-
sion is by asking each side to stipulate a central undisputed fact .of the
controversy. The actual pre-trial dealt with an action in which one in-
surance company sued another insurance company to determine whether
the public liability policy of one company or both companies covered the
operation of a truck tractor in a collision in which passengers in the other
car were htir brought suit, and were paid settlements. In substance,
therefore, the initial question at the general conference was whether each
side admitted the fact of the collision. With the ground thus broken, the
questioning took up all facts and documents which might be stipulated,
after which counsel was given the opportunity to request any further
stipulations.
In a breach of contract action the obvious place to begin is with the
claimed c6ntract. The plaintiff will be asked to state whether the claimed
contract was written or oral. If the answer is "written," plaintiff's coun-
sel will be asked to present each docunent, communication, or other writ-
ten memoranda which it is claimed compose the contract. As each is
produced, counsel will be asked if the other side may see it Following
examination, counsel is asked if the exhibit may be stipulated. Even
should opposing counsel not agree that the exhibit is material, he will
usually stipulate its authenticity, reserving the question of materiality for
the trial. If the claimed contract is oral or partly oral, the fact of each
claimed conversation is gone into, with the possibility of a stipulation be-
ing requested concerning each claimed fact.
In actions involving motor vehicle accidents the ideal way in which to
open the discussion is by the court asking to look at the police report.
With the knowledge gained from the police report and the pleadings the
court then is able to pick out a significant undisputed fact for stipulation.
The same approach works well in other types of cases. Experience
has shown that by starting with a central undisputed fact of the contro-
versy there are several advantages. First, it immediately demonstrates
that the pre-trial is not in fun, but that it will be a serious effort to come
to grips with the case. Secondly, by commencing with an undisputed
fact a spirit of consent can be generated at the outset of the general con-
ference which often helps to get the parties into a stipulating frame of
mind. Finally, it sets the pattern for the first portion of the general con-
ference in which each counsel is asked specifically about his willingness
to stipulate on those points which appear to be susceptible of agreement.
The court then asks plaintiff's counsel to explain plaintiff's position
with reference to the first ultimate issue of the case. It is the writer's
practice to then request defendant's counsel to give defendantes position
on the same issue. Thus the rival positions are developed alternately on
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each of the ultimate issues in the case. The present presiding judge of
pre-trial, Daniel H. Wasserman, on the other hand, gets a complete state-
ment from plaintiff's counsel on all issues before he turns to defendant's
counsel for his statement. Regardless, however, of which approach is
used, the purpose is the same-to require each side in the presence of
the other to take a position on the basic issues of the case.
The court may follow up with additional questions to clarify a posi-
tion. The court may also elicit the nature of supporting evidence on a
particular issue, but unless the situation comes within In re Keough4 the
court would be unwarranted in asking counsel to name or identify the
witness who would give the supporting evidence.
Though questions are ordinarily directed at counsel, often they will
say, "My client knows the answer to that question, let him answer."
Either he or his client may answer a question with assurance that at some
future hearing his answer or that of his client may not be used against
him, in view of the pre-trial rules that:
Statements of the parties or their counsel made in the course of the
pre-trial hearing shall not be binding upon the parties unless expressly
made so by written stipulation at pre-trial.
In the third and final portion of the general conference the court
passes upon all open interlocutory questions such as questions regarding
the pleadings, demurrers to interrogatories, objections to questions pro-
pounded in depositions to which no answers have been given, any plead-
ing questions not previously disposed of and ascertainment of whether
the case (if a jury case) will be tried to a lesser jury or the jury will be
waived.
So far the discussion of the issues has chiefly described the court's
part in the general conference. The endeavor has been to show that the
court must discard his conventional judicial role as an umpire and be-
come an active though impartial interrogator whose task is to thoroughly
develop the issues, to get each side to affirm its position concerning each
issue and to encourage voluntary agreement and admissions on all pos-
sible-points.
Fully as important in achieving a thorough general conference is the
part played by counsel. Counsel, with rare exceptions, willingly respond
when asked to state a client's position. Only infrequently will a lawyer
answer, "Judge, there is my petition, it says everything I have to say on
the subject." Invariably this point of view is expressed by a lawyer who
has never before participated in a pre-trial. It is met by suggesting to
him that pre-trial will advise him, much more precisely than the plead-
ings do, as to what his opposing counsel's position is. But one must give
11151 Ohio St. 307 (1949).
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in order to get. If he wants to hear the other side's position he must be
willing to reveal his own. It is further pointed out that stipulations, if
secured, may help to shorten the trial However, stipulations most often
come about as by-products of an effective discussion of the issues. There-
fore, unless the parties are willing to enter into an exchange of views on
the issues, stipulations will undoubtedly not be reached.
Finally, it is stressed to the lawyer who is reluctant to state his client's
position that the court's usefulness in conducting settlement negotiations
depends on his comprehension and understanding of the case. If the
court is to help the parties arrive at a fair appraisal of the case he must
first know what the case is all about, through frank and detailed answers
to the court's questions.
As a great body of experience has accumulated from the continuous
operation of our thoroughgoing pre-trial system, it has become quite evi-
dent that counsel's work before the pre-trial is the work that really counts.
If either counsel come to the pre-trial with basic investigation and prepa-
ration yet undone, the pre-trial probably will not be fruitful and may re-
quire a further pre-trial.
Beginning about a year ago at the suggestion of Judge Joseph H.
Silbert, then assigned to pre-trial, cases are first published by the Daily
Legal News in the "Active Pre-Trial List" for several weeks, and then they
are scheduled for a definite date and certain time. Counsel who regularly
appear at pre-trial report that as soon as a case appears in the "Active
Pre-Trial List" they pull out the file and determine what has to be done to
get ready for pre-trial. A deposition may be taken, a witness interviewed,
a photograph taken, or a medical examination of the plaintiff secured. If
there is too much to be done in the time allotted the case will be passed
out of the "Active Pre-Trial List" for a fixed period.
Last minute continuances of pre-trial hearings due to unexpected en-
gagements of counsel in other hearings has caused some difficulty of
scheduling. To meet these sudden gaps an extra list of two or three cases
subject to pre-trial call was established on the recommendation of Judge
Daniel H. Wasserman. If a scheduled case is passed, a case from the
extra list is assigned. When an extra case remains unassigned it is heard
at the end of the regular calendar of the pre-trial judge.
In this concluding part of "discussion of the issues" specific examples
of stipulations will be considered. However, it should first be noted that
the practice of totalling the number of stipulations, secured annually, has
not been followed since 1951. The former figures, without an explana-
tion of the type of stipulations, were meaningless; yet to take time to
record the precise nature of each stipulation has seemed to be unnecessary
bookkeeping.
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Experience, however, shows that as the general conference unfolds, if
stipulations are deliberately and continuously sought by the pre-trial
judge, many can be obtained. The judge of course must be ever mindful
that it is not the admission of controverted facts that he seeks but that
"only willingly, though perhaps not spontaneously, admitted undisputed
facts are sought."5
Recurring types of stipulations include-
(1) Admissions of corporate capacity to sue, and legal capacity to sue
as administrator, or other fiduciary;
(2) Validity though not necessarily the materiality of city ordinances,
administrative regulations of the state and federal government, and
of the laws of other states;
(3) The admissibility or authenticity, without further identification, of
photostatic copies of hospital records, photographs, deeds, leases,
searches of tide, insurance policies, contracts, correspondence, death
certificates and other public records.
Two methods of recording stipulations are now in use. Four pre-
trial orders of both types are in Appendix D (pages --_). In one method
the court records them in his pre-trial book, transcribes them in letter
form with the original filed in the case, and has copies sent to each coun-
sel. In the other, counsel prepares the stipulation at the court's direction,
after which it is filed in the case.
A universally workable method of securing stipulations and of pre-
paring pre-trial orders is yet to be accomplished in our pre-trial procedure.
Seeking to fill this gap, at the beginning of this year (1956), the pre-
trial committee of our court authorized the preparation of pre-trial check
sheets as a means of standardizing the general conferences held by the
different pre-trial judges, and as a way of assisting the pre-trial judge in
securing more stipulations. To date, pre-trial check sheets for use in
negligence actions and in divorce actions have been prepared for use.
Copies of these forms are included in Appendix E (pages 414-17).
THE FOURTH ESSENTIAL - THE SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS
In the early months of the new pre-trial procedure the second part
of the pre-trial was introduced by the court stating, "If the parties would
like to discuss settlement the court will be happy to take up the matter of
settlement separately with each side." One of the lawyers might respond
"I am always willing to talk settlement, Judge." The other attorney
would then add that he had no objection. Never once was the offer re-
jected.
Now it is routine, when the first part of the pre-trial is completed, for
the court to announce that he desires to discuss settlement with each side.
'Kincaid, A Judge's Handbook of Pre-trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955).
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The order of these--separate discussions will vary with the case, and de-
pends on the pre-trial judge.
It has been this writer's practice to meet first either with plaintiff's
counsel alone, orwith plaintiff's counsel and the plaintiff, and thereafter
with defendant's coiinsel alone or with both defendant's counsel and de-
fendant. The circumstances of the case determine the number of these
separate sessions. Taken together they serve a five-fold purpose:
First. The court has an opportunity to learn from each side its version
of prior settlement negotiations.
Second. It provides an opportunity for the separate revelation of any
surprise evidence, or undisclosed legal arguments not brought out in the
general conference. Though the court receives -this material in confi-
dence, he should weigh it in making his own settlement evaluation.
Third. It permits each counsel to assess the 'strong points and weak
points of his side in a private discussion with the -court.
Fourth. Each counsel can tell the court in, confidence the true value
which he places on the case, whereas the inherent awkwardness of direct
settlement negotiations prevent him from disclosing this figure to the
other side.
Fifth. In settlement negotiations a. chasm may divide the parties. The
court bridges that chasm. Over that bridge each may travel to an inter-
mediate point there to join hands with the other side.. Mindful that he
alone may be apprised of the whole picture, the pre-trial judge seeks to
arrive with the parties at a figure which represents substantial justice be-
tween them
Nevertheless, it does not follow that every case can be settled; nor
for that matter should every case be settled. All that can or should be
done by the pre-trial judge is to be sure that the possibilities of settlement
have been fully plumbed. Pre-trial does not seek to coerce settlements
but desires, only to attain voluntary agreements freely negotiated.. If at
the completion of the separate discussions the minimum demand of the
plaintiff and the maximum offer of the defendant are out of reach of
each other, the court wishes both parties well and sends the controversy
on its way for a jury or the trial judge to resolve.
In reporting his November 1952 visit in our court with "those judges
specially experienced in pre-trial use and procedure" Judge Clarence L.
Kincaid reports:
A full discussion of the subject disclosed" universal approval of it, par-
ticularly in the results obtained as to settlement. They seemed to agree
that the matter of possible settlement should be the first object of inquiry
at the hearing and if indications were favorable, a continuance to another
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date pending further discussions was advisable; that only when it became
evident it could be settled should real pre-trial procedure be applied.'
There are still some judges on our Court who retain the view that
settlement should be the first subject of discussion at pre-trial. There is
plausibility in this point of view which says, "Why take an hour or more
to go into a detailed discussion of the issues of the case before you get
around to the subject of possible settlement, when the case might have
been settled right away had the matter of settlement been taken up first?"
But it does not work out that way in practice. In the course of this
writer's pre-trial service in the Common Pleas Courts of Cuyahoga and
Geauga Counties he has observed the relative merits of pre-trial confer-
ences in which settlement is the first order of business, and pre-trial con-
ferences in which discussion of the issues occurs first and settlement nego-
tiations come last. These are the writer's observations:
(1) In a case in which the parties prior to the pre-trial are already
close together in their propositions of settlement the court, without a dis-
cussion of the issues, can sometimes (but not always) get the parties
themselves to close the narrow gap, or the court can suggest a figure
which both will accept.
(2) If settlement negotiations are taken up first, and there is no
general discussion of the issues, and settlement ensues only after a hag-
gling match, any settlement thus reached may create in the parties the
feeling that it was a forced settlement.
(3) If settlement negotiations are taken up first, and they falter,
the lack of success throws up a smoke screen of frustration and misunder-
standing. Completely dispelled is the amicable atmosphere so necessary
to obtain a frank discussion of issues, a willing exchange of information
and voluntary stipulations. When such a pre-trial ends there is no set-
tlement, and there is likely to be a wholly unsatisfactory discussion of the
issues and no stipulations.
(4) If discussion of the issues comes first, counsel and the parties
come to feel that an orderly proceeding is being held to remove the tight-
ly wrapped husks that conceal the nubbin of the controversy. A spirit
of give and take is engendered which helps to clarify each side's under-
standing of the case, to achieve stipulations, and to better prepare each
side for trial. The momentum of this same spirit may even carry over
into the settlement negotiations and produce a settlement. But even if a
settlement does not result during the second part of the pre-trial, the
parties still will go away from the pre-trial with a sense of accomplish-
ment, and a feeling that the time spent at the pre-trial was not wasted.
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(5) Finally, if discussion of the issues comes first, both counsel and
the parties are in a better position to appraise the value of the case for
settlement, and the court, having learned what the case is all about and
having gauged the strength and weakness of each side, can acquire a
judgment of the real potentialities of the case which may assist both sides
in arriving at a fair and reasonable compromise.
SHOULD ALL CVL LITIGATION BE PEm-TRiED?
The general rule now in effect in our Court is that all civil cases are
pre-tried. However, since certain types of cases lend themselves more
readily to a discussion of the issues in the first half of the pre-trial than
they do to settlement negotiations in the second half of the pre-trial spe-
cial problems in the application of the general rule will be noted.
In any case in which the judge serves as the trier of the facts he can
freely conduct the first half of the pre-trial dealing with a discussion of
the issues. He must of course be careful to avoid exposure to matters
prejudicial in nature which might affect his later judgments at the trial.
Nevertheless he will find that the first half of the pre-trial aids him
greatly in the trial of the case by acquainting him with the issues, by
shortening the trial through the stipulation of uncontroverted facts, and
by directing his thinking to the legal principles which may possibly be
pertinent.
On the other hand, the judge who is to serve as the trier of the facts
is not as free to conduct settlement negotiations in the second half of the
pre-trial as he would be in a jury case. Notwithstanding this, as every
judge knows who has tried jury-waived or equity cases, occasionally even
these are settled by the trial judge.
Here in our common pleas court, now consisting of fifteen judges
and soon to have nineteen (January 1957), it has become an unwritten
rule that the pre-trial judge will not try the case. This has permitted our
pre-trial judges to inquire without reservation into all possible phases of
the case. It has given them complete latitude in seeking, as conciliators,
to settle the case.
Our divorce pre-trials are devoted first and foremost to efforts at
reconciliation. Should these fail, there follows a thorough discussion of
the nature and value of the marital property, marital indebtedness, indi-
vidual income and property, arrearages, and any other financial matters.
Full opportunity is furnished to secure all possible stipulations on these
foregoing items. Also at the pre-trial a referee of our Deparzment of
Domestic Relations is available to meet with the parties if they care to
avail themselves of his services in seeking agreement on any of their fi-
nancial differences. The divorce pre-trial manifestly and deliberately
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avoids any consideration of the evidence proposed to be offered concern-
ing the presence or absence of grounds of divorce or alimony. It goes
without saying that a divorce pre-trial differs in one huge respect from
pre-trials in other cases. There can be no settlement of the question of
whether a divorce will be granted, and therefore there is no settlement
discussion.
As to special proceedings, appropriation cases are susceptible to a dis-
cussion of the issues, and to canvassing the possibility of stipulations, but
settlement discussions are ordinarily futile, because of the restrictions un-
der which public bodies necessarily operate in this respect.
Appeals in unemployment insurance cases have not accomplished
much at pre-trial.
By contrast, workmen's compensation appeals have been very satis-
factorily pre-tried. The Industrial Commission of Ohio, at the request 'of
our pre-trial judges, has cooperated with our Court by assigning Mr.
Homer Hickling, the head of its legal department to attend on behalf of
the Commission the pre-trial of Workmen's Compensation appeals. His
presence has greatly facilitated the disposition of a substantial number of
these cases. What the effect of the new law will be on the pre-trial of
workmen's compensation cases remains to be seen. However, it is an-
ticipated that with the expected rise in the number of workmen's com-
pensation cases in our court the usefulness of pre-trial in handling them
should continue.
THE FIFTH ESSENTIAL - THE FOLLOW THROUGH
In about one-third of all cases pre-tried it is necessary to follow
through with extra effort, after the pre-trial, in order to conclude it.
Sometimes this requires an additional meeting; other times the task can
be finished by telephone. Often the pre-trial reveals the need on either
or both sides for an up-to-date medical examination, or a further deposi-
tion or some other preparation before the parties are in a position to
finally place a settlement value on the case, or are ready for trial.
Each pre-trial judge has discovered that a backlog of pre-tried, or
partially pre-tried cases builds up, which either await a further meeting,
or a report from counsel about a settlement proposition or some unfin-
ished matter of preparation or stipulation. Notes must be kept of things
which remain to be done in each retained case. The pre-trial judge soon
learns that follow through, by himself and his bailiff, is an indispensable
essential if a pre-trial docket is to be successfully administered.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A -AN ACTUAL PRE-TRIAL
THE STATE OF OHIO, S
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA, 
SS:
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FARi BUREAU MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
VS.
GREAT AMERICAN INDEMNITY
COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants.
NO. 638,222
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS*
THOMAS, J.
April 6, 1956
APPEARANCES:
On behalf of Plaintiffs:
Messrs. After, Hadden, Wykoff and VanDuzer,
By: Smith Warder, Esq., of counsel.
On behalf of Defendants:
Messrs. Davis and Young,
By: Rees H. Davis, Esq., of counsel.
Blanche B. Crile,
Official Court Reporter,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
THE COURT: The record may show that the usual rule followed in a pre-
'trial hearing in which the statements of counsel are not reported, is being changed
in this proceeding because of the fact that counsel and their parties have kindly
consented to permit this particular pre-trial to be reported and thus make it possible
for a transcription of it to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Western Re-
serve Law Review.
The following stipulation will be entered into to govern the pre-trial:
It is agreed by and between the parties that the pre-trial may be reported ver-
batim;
It is further agreed by and between the parties that statements made by counsel
or the parties during the course of the pre-trial will not be binding on either side in
any later hearing which may occur in this case, unless by express agreement as :we
conduct the pre-trial the parties specifically agree that a certain point may be stipu-
lated, in which case those stipulations would then be reduced to writing and in-
corporated in a pre-trial order which would be then binding upon the parties dur-
ing the later course of this case.
Is that statement and stipulation agreeable to plaintiff, Mr. Warder?
MR. WARDER: Perfectly.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: It is.
MR. WARDER: Thanks for reminding me that I am for the plaintiff.
THE COURT: Gentlemen, I have gone over the pleadings in this matter
and as I read them it occurred to me that there are a number of points that are ad-
mitted on both sides and I would like to record all of the points that can be ad-
This is an action for declaratory' relief.
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mitted and then when we reach a point that is disputed we can, of course, hear from
each side so stating.
First of all it appears, I believe, gentlemen, that on May 10, 1951 a collision
occurred -
MR. WARDER: This is Mr. Coakley, Judge Thomas (indicating).
THE COURT: How do you do, Mr. Coakley. How do you spell your name?
MR. COAKLEY: C-o-a-k-l-e-y.
THE COURT: The record may show that Mr. Coakley, a representative of
Farm Bureau, now known as Nationwide Insurance Company, has arrived; and on
that same subject, Mr. Davis, you informed me just an hour or so ago that illness
will prevent the appearance of Mr. Dearie?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: How do you spell his name?
MR. DAVIS: D-e-a-r-i-e.
THE COURT: Just like it ought to sound, is that it? He is the local repre-
sentative of Great American?
MR. DAVIS: He is the head of the local claim office of the Great American.
THE COURT: All right. I understand gentlemen, the pleadings - it is
admitted that on May 10, 1951 a collision occurred at or near the intersection of
Detroit Road and Dover Road in the County of Cuyahoga, State of Ohio, and that
collision involved a westbound tractor and a passenger automobile, I believe, operated
in a northerly direction, if I recall correctly; is that correct?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: The westerly-bound tractor was operated by George A. Martin,
Jr. -
MR. WARDER: That is right.
THE COURT: - and the northerly-bound automobile was being driven
by Dennis Morris, and in it was his wife Bertha Morris. Are those facts agreed on?
MR. WARDER: I am agreed.
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
THE COURT: Now, then, secondly, without going into details, it is agreed
that some injuries were sustained by Bertha Morris -
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: - and Dennis Morris; is that correct?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: That is correct?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, that is correct.
THE COURT: Do you care at this time to indicate the extent of those in-
juries?
MR. DAVIS: Do you want the extent of the money that we paid?
THE COURT: Well, we are going to get to that in a moment so perhaps
we can save any discussion of injuries for that point.
MR. WARDER: I would think so.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DAVIS: I didn't bring that file with me so I don't recall what the
injuries were; the woman was laid up for several months but I don't know -
THE COURT: Now, then, the next point which appears to be admitted on
both sides is that the tractor was owned by Florence Baxter and Ford Baxter, or
was owned by Florence Baxter and Ford had the right to use it? Which?
MR. DAVIS: Well, that is a question.
MR. WARDER: That is a good question. We don't honestly know the
answer to that.
THE COURT: What do you say, Mr. Warder, on behalf of the plaintiff?
MR. WARDER: It is my understanding it was Florence Baxter, but as there
is no documentary evidence on that I am relying on what Ford Baxter told me.
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THE COURT: What do you say, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: My understanding is that Florence Baxter's husband had died
shortly before this time, before the time this contract was entered into in 1950 -
THE COURT: Excuse me; who is Florence Baxter's husband, Ford Baxter?
MR. DAVIS: No, that is a son.
THE COURT: Oh!
MR. DAVIS: I don't know what her husband - the title of the car was in
the name of Florence Baxter.
THE COURT: The title of the tractor?
MR. DAVIS: The tide of the tractor, yes; but Ford Baxter was the operator
MR. WARDER: No.
MR. DAVIS: I don't mean the driver, but he is the one that signed the con-
tract with the Lake Shore; but on the contract which we will later show, there is a
notation on the side "registered in the name of mother, Florence Baxter."
MR. WARDER: Well, I don't think we have any disagreement here; my
understanding is that Florence Baxter owned the business; that her son ran it more
or less as a manager with full authority to sign any contract; and there is no ques-
tion but what he had the authority to execute it;, but she owned the business.
THE COURT: Just to get that relationship dear, Ford Baxter is the son of
Florence Baxter, is that right?
MR. WARDER: He is her son.
THE COURT: Can it be stipulated, gentlemen, that the actual certificate of
title of the tractor was in the name of Florence Baxter?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: I assume so; yes.
THE COURT: Can that be agreed?
MR. DAVIS: I think so; yes.
THE COURT: All right. Now, then, that brings us to the contract to
which you have made reference, Mr. Davis. As I understand it, there was a contract
between Lake Shore Motor Freight and Ford Baxter; is that correct?
MR. DAVIS: That is right.
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of it there?
MR. DAVIS: A photostatic copy; I think we furnished it
MR. WARDER: You have.
THE COURT: Gentlemen, I am going to mark this, if I may, as Pre-trial
Exhibit 1.
MR. DAVIS: We have the original some place.
THE COURT: Now, with reference to Pre-trial Exhibit 1, which appears
to be in the original form a single sheet with printing on front side and back side
and with the signatures on the first page, do you say, Mr. Davis, that this is the
agreement which was signed by Ford-Baxter and Lake Shore Motor Freight on or
about the 26th day of August, 1950?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Warder, are you prepared to stipulate that this
is a correct photostatic copy of the original agreement?
MR. WARDER: That is what I wanted to ask the question about. This
accident occurred May 10, 1951; this agreement is executed August 26, 1950. Now,
was this, the same agreement in effect? That is what I want to be certain of.
MR. DAVIS: Yes, that is the same agreement that was in effect.
MR. WARDER: And there is no subsequent
MR. DAVIS: No.
MR. WARDER: I will stipulate.
MR. DAVIS: You will note, I think, that that agreement continues in effect
until cancelled by one of the parties; that there is no other agreement, that I know
of, prior to May 10, 1951.
THE COURT: All right. The record may show that the parties have stipu-
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lated that Pre-trial Exhibit 1 was and continued to be the contract in full force and
effect between Lake Shore Motor Freight, which I believe was the party of the second
part, and Ford Baxter, who was the party of the first part in said agreement.
MR. WARDER: Haven't you got them just backwards, Judge?
THE COURT: Well, it says here - you are quite right; you are quite right;
I have just reversed it; Lake Shore Motor Freight Company is the first party and
Ford Baxter is the second party; and that this agreement was in full force and effect
on May 10, 1951, on the date of the collision; is that correct?
MR. WARDER: That is correct.
MR. DAVIS: Um huh.
THE COURT: Now, that brings us, I think, to the insurance policies. First
of all, with reference to the policy of Farm Bureau, Mr. Warder, what are the
facts in that respect?
MR. WARDER: I have here what purports to be a copy of it -I am sure
Mr. Davis has a copy of it, don't you? Do you have a copy of our policy?
MR. DAVIS: Not of yours, no.
MR. WARDER: Well, now, this is just a copy, it is not admissible - in the
event we can't stipulate I will have to bring up the records from Canton, it is now
- then Columbus - but here, you can look it over (indicating); I am sure that is
the policy.
MR. DAVIS: I will admit that is a copy of the policy.
THE COURT: All right; the policy, copy which has been submitted by Mr.
Warder as a true and correct copy of the original policy, will be marked as Pre-
trial Exhibit 2. May it be stipulated, gentlemen, that this is the policy of casualty
insurance that covered Ford Baxter in the operation of the tractor involved in the
collision, and which policy was in full force and effect on May 10, 1951?
MR. WARDER: I will so stipulate; yes.
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: Both sides stipulate?
MR. WARDER: Yes. I think it might be well to explain here that there
may have been a technical defense under this policy in that if Florence Baxter was
the owner I can't help wondering whether the policy was properly issued to Ford
Baxter? However, no one ever raised any question about it, we just went along
with it.
MR. DAVIS: That I would say would indicate the policy - that title might
have been in the name of Ford Baxter in spite of -
MR. WARDER: I don't think it was; I think it was in Florence.
MR. DAVIS: I think it was too; I think it was in Florence Baxter; but there
has never been any question raised about it.
MR. WARDER: Nobody ever questioned it - nor wanted to question it.
THE COURT: Nor will question it?
MR. WARDER: That is right.
THE COURT: All right: Now, then with reference to the Great American
Casualty policy which insured Lake Shore Motor Freight, do you have a copy of
that, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: I have a copy of various forms, part of it, here (indicating).
THE COURT: Can you put it together in one composite policy, do you think?
MR. DAVIS: With everything in this, photostatic copy - there is every-
thing there except the complete policy form itself. What I mean by that, is the
routine policy there. You see, what I have there is the dealer's daily report, and
so forth, and you understand that this policy covered three or four assureds, who
were named there, and then was used under the PUCO, ICC, forms were issued, and
then the special forms were issued to particular people for whom they were doing
carrying, like United States Steel and Ford Motor, American Steel and Wire -
people for whom they were transporting materials; so that everything is in that
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policy except - I mean in that exhibit there, except the policy form, of which
have a blank copy here (indicating).
THE COURT: I see. All right. Mr. Warder, would you like to examine
that?
MR. DAVIS: It hasn't been filled in. Did you ever see one of those?
MR. WARDER: No. All you ever let me have was just your blank policq
form.
MR. DAVIS: As a matter of fact, I haven't seen it myself until this morning
THE COURT: We will take a few minutes then to permit counsel to examine
this proposed exhibit.
MR. DAVIS: If the Court would like to look that over too (indicating).
THE COURT: Well, we will put this on the record so we can try to arriv,
at something here. The record may show that there has been an examination of
a photostatic exhibit submitted by Mr. Davis to Mr. Warder, and do I understand
Mr. Davis, that you represent that the photostatic exhibit which you presented to
Mr. Warder contains photostatic copies of various and several parts of the 'polic?
pf insurance, public liability insurance, that insured Lake Shore Motor Freight on
May 10, 1951?
MR. DAVIS: That is right, and it does not contain the general policy form
THE COURT: And except for the general policy or standard provisions?
MR. DAVIS: That is right.
THE COURT: This exhibit, you say, contains the entire policy?
MR. DAVIS: Yes. To get the policy correctly before the Court it probably
would have to have copied - the first sheet copied on here; then we could present
a copy of the policy as issued, plus the various endorsements.
THE COURT: I am wondering if perhaps this might not be a good way to
proceed: Suppose Mr. Davis were asked to agree to make up a complete policy,
and together with that have an affidavit signed by a responsible officer of the
corporation that that was the complete policy of insurance on Lake Shore Motor
Freight as of that date of May 10, 1951? First of all, is that a possible request?
MR. DAVIS: That is possible.
THE COURT: If that request
MR. DAVIS: Let me interrupt just a moment; a responsible officer of which
company? The Lake Shore or the Great American, or both?
THE COURT: Well, I would think it would be Great American and
,ertainly Great American and perhaps Lake Shore as well.
MR. DAVIS: I presume in that connection, when you say "a responsible
officer," I presume Mr. Preslon, the agent who issues the policy, who carries the in-
iurance, would be the one to identify it, or we could have an affidavit executed by
mn officer in New York.
THE COURT: I notice the answers to the interrogatories were signed by the
secretary, Mr. B. J. Salamack; perhaps he would be the one.
MR. DAVIS: Okay.
THE COURT: What do you say about that approach to it, Mr. Warder?
MR. WARDER: I am a little bit reluctant to rely on an affidavit on some-
thing like that that really is the $64 question. Now, what is the extent of their
coverage and what is the extent of our coverage, as I see it, are the only two im-
portant questions in this lawsuit.
THE COURT: In other words, putting it another way, the basic question in
this lawsuit is whether the tractor that collided with the Morris car was insured,
(a) by Farm Bureau, or (b) by Great American, or (c) by both?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: If C is correct, then you would have a further question: To
the extent of proportionate responsibility of each company?
Is that the basic fact or crucial issue of the case?
MR. WARDER: That is the case. Very dear.
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THE COURT: Do you agree with that Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Well, I'll see. A by Farm Bureau?
THE COURT: A by Farm Bureau alone.
MR. DAVIS: That is right.
THE COURT: B by Great American alone.
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: C by both; and if it is C, then it becomes a question of the
proportion of liability to each.
MR. DAVIS: Not of the proportion, but of their respective liabilities;
whether primary or secondary.
THE COURT: Well, I think the primary or secondary question would come
under A or B - no, not necessarily, because you say "alone," don't you?
MR. DAVIS: There is no question that as far as we are concerned, that we
covered this tractor to the extent of $10,000; that, as I say, we, the Great American
THE COURT: At the time of the accident?
MR. DAVIS: At the time of the accident; there is no question about that.
THE COURT: Under your policy?
MR. DAVIS: No, this rider that we were required to put on under the ICC;
it has that coverage; assuming that it is effective - I mean, if there were no other
insurance on there they would have that coverage from the Great American because
of the endorsement put on by the Lake Shore, the ICC requirements; so there
isn't any question about that.
Now, if the Farm Bureau, having also covered this tractor, then the question is,
first, whether the Farm Bureau coverage is primary or whether the Great American
coverage is primary; second, if the Great American coverage is on there at all - I
will change that. If the Great American and Farm Bureau both cover, without any
question as to which is primary and which is secondary, then the question would
be, which is the question in the lawsuit, as to whether the $10,000 applies only on
the Great American policy or whether the $200,000, which is their -or $400,000,
which is their total coverage?
Our position is that, first, that the Farm Bureau is primary coverage; second, that
if they should find that the Farm Bureau is not the primary coverage, then we are
in there equally with the Farm Bureau on $10,000 apiece and we each owe half of
the settlement.
THE COURT: What is the position of Farm Bureau, Mr. Warder?
MR. WARDER: Well, we maintain, first, that they are the primary coverer -
THE COURT: That is Great American?
MR. WARDER: Great American is the primary coverer; and candidly, off
the record, my own opinion is - you can write this down but I don't wish to be
bound by it, that is why I say it is my own opinion on it - it is probably dual cover-
age; I really don't think either one is primary; I think it is dual coverage, personally.
MR. DAVIS: Let's take this off the record so the Court my be fully advised.
THE COURT: We can take it all down here; we have full control of the
record.
MR. DAVIS: We paid $9,250 on the basis of $210,000, is that right?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: We paid 20/21sts of it; we got them to get the Morris suits
out of the way.
THE COURT: Yes. In other words, the total amount paid in the settle-
ment - perhaps we better say this by way of introduction:
That as a result of the collision which occurred on May 10, 1951 there were
three lawsuits brought in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County; one by
Bertha Morris for her own injuries, against Lake Shore and Ford Baxter, and maybe
Florence Baxter too, I am not sure -
MR. DAVIS: I think Martin too, the driver.
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THE COURT: - and George Martin, the driver?
MR. DAVIS: I am not sure.
THE COURT: In any event, she brought a lawsuit against several claimed
tort feasors for her injuries; secondly, her husband brought a lawsuit for his injuries
and the damage to his car; and thirdly, he brought a lawsuit for loss of services -
MR. DAVIS: Nor for the damage to his car, for his injuries; and the third
was the loss of services.
THE COURT: The third was the loss of services. Now then, those actions
having been pending here in our county for a while, last Summer, I guess, or last
Spring sometime there was a settlement of those three cases; is that right?
MR. DAVIS: That is right.
THE COURT: And the total amount of those settlements were what?
MR. DAVIS: $9,250.
THE COURT: How much of that did you pay? By the way, is there an
agreement of settlement?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right;, we will mark as Pre-trial Exhibit - I think we
will mark this as 4 because we are going to save a number for the Great American
insurance policy.
You just handed me, Mr. Davis, 2 sheets stapled together, which I take it is a
copy of a memorandum of settlement entered into between you and Mr. Warder, is
that right?
MR. DAVIS: That is right.
THE COURT: What do you say about that, Mr. Warder? Is that an accurate
copy of that memorandum (indicating)?
MR. DAVIS: Here is a signed one (indicating).
MR. WARDER: Yes, I would like to see the signed one.
MR. DAVIS: Sure,.that is right;, that is exactly it;, sure.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DAVIS: In behalf of the execution of that agreement, Great American
Indemnity Company paid 20/21sts of the total amount of $9,250; and Farm Bu-
reau
THE COURT: May I stop you right there? That fraction, or that propor-
tion was on the basis of what?
MR. DAVIS: The basis that the Great American total policy was 200-400,000;
Farm Bureau policy was 10-20; so it was 20 - we figured either way; using the
200,000 it would be 210,000, 20/21sts of that;, and the other paid 1/21st of it.
THE COURT: 210 over 10?
MR. DAVIS: That is right.
THE COURT: Without reading this memorandum into the record, I take
it that you reserve for determination in this declaratory judgment action the ultimate
question of responsibility for the entire settlement?
MR. WARDER: That is right.
MR. DAVIS: We drew that agreement so there would be no question of
volunteers or anybody admitting any liability, primary liability, secondary liability
or joint liability.
MR. WARDER: It was completely without prejudice.
THE COURT: Yes. That permits me to ask this question: Is there any
claim that this settlement was a volunteer settlement which would
MR. WARDER: No.
THE COURT: Farm Bureau is not making such a claim?
MR. WARDER: No.
MR. DAVIS: No.
THE COURT: That brings us back here to the question of what we were
discussing, namely, what steps could be taken to ascertain with accuracy just what
the policy was, that covered Lake Shore. What about the proposal that you were
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commenting on? Can you make any other suggestions, Mr. Warder, what you
wiould accept as a method of verifying -
. MR. WARDER: Oh, if both Lake Shore and Great American submitted an
affidavit that that was it, or even just a letter, I don't really care, if it is verified,
I guess I would take it. You can't change facts; but I have to be - this has been so
confusing to me - just like that endorsement that is dated after the accident. Now,
as far as I would go, of course, would be to admit that this was the policy - the legal
tffect of it I would want to leave open.
THE COURT: I appreciate that. Well, then, suppose that we do just that,
Mr. Davis; can you get that?
MR. DAVIS: I think so. It may take a few days.
THE COURT: Surely all right, then it is agreed that Mr. Davis will procure
a complete policy, copy of the original policy, over the signatures of Lake Shore and
Great American, that is an accurate, complete copy of the effective policy.
MR. DAVIS: Existing on May 10, 1951.
THE COURT: Right. Gentlemen, I think that will probably conclude the
things that can be stipulated.
MR. WARDER: No, I don't think so.
THE COURT: No? Well, let's see what other additional facts, first, from
the standpoint of the plaintiff, are subject to stipulation.
MR. WARDER: Well, I have been served with Notice To Take Depositions
in Youngstown on Tuesday. It is my understanding you are going to take the depo-
tition of the driver of this truck?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. WARDER: I can't imagine anything that he would say that I wouldn't
itipulate to.
MR. DAVIS: Well
MR. WARDER: What are you trying to prove?
MR. DAVIS: The only thing I am trying to prove on that, and I would say
that it is probably not a very strong point, is that the reason for this collision was the
tomplete failure of his brakes. That is his statement.
MR. WARDER: Well -
MR. DAVIS: And the provision of the contract, to keep it in good condition.
That is the only thing we are going to ask the driver.
MR. WARDER: Could we stipulate, Mr. Davis, that the accident of May
10, 1951 occurred under such circumstances that there was probable liability on the
part of Lake Shore Motor Freight, Florence Baxter, Ford Baxter and George Martin?
MR. DAVIS: Well, we can stipulate that but that doesn't cover the point that
I have in mind. There was no question that there was such liability -
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: - but the question I am raising is whether the accident was
due to a faulty condition of the equipment, which under the contract with Lake
Shore, Baxter agrees to keep the equipment in good working condition. That is
my point; not the question of liability of the accident.
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: Now, whether that is important in the question of the generai
liability between the two companies, I am not sure, but I just want to cover every
point possible.
MR. WARDER: Yes. Well
THE COURT: Let me ask this, Smith, on that point: Since you said that it is
possible that maybe the deposition could be avoided, do you by any chance have and
would you want to show a signed statement of Martin, which conceivably you
might have on that? Now, if that is not a fair question, why, tell me so.
MR. DAVIS: No - I will tell you: I think we have, and I will tell you the
reason we don't have it here: Because this file is about that big (indicating), and I
separated it, the parts that I thought would be pertinent to bring down here; and
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the parts that deal with the Morris cases are all in the office. Now, I may have
such a statement, Smith may have it, or the Farm Bureau, because they made the
original investigation.
MR. WARDER: He told that to the police; there is no question about that.
MR. DAVIS: Pardon me?
MR. WARDER: George Martin told that to the police. And I wanted to
check the statement we have from George Martin and here it is (indicating).
(Reading) "He was driving north and was waiting at the light -
THE COURT: Driving north?
MR. WARDER: "He was driving north and was waiting at the light which
had been green for me and was changing to yellow."
THE COURT: "He,' meaning the other fellow?
MR. WARDER: Yes. "It was raining and the pavement was slippery. This
is a thiee-lane road and the pavement is brick and patched with asphalt. I had
been driving around 25 to 30 miles per hour. I was empty and I was going to Eor-
ain for a load. I am regularly employed by Ford Baxter, son of Florence, as a
truck driver. The traffic light where this accident happened hangs right in the
center of the intersection of Dover Road and Detroit and when I was about 10
feet short of the intersection, the light changed to yellow. I was about right under
the light when it changed to red for me. I knew when the light started to change
that I could never stop without going into the intersection and so I went on in. As
I say, I was under the light when it changed to red. I had seen two cars stopped for
the light and these cars were headed north (Morris) and touth (unknown). When
I was right under the light, I make breaking motions with my hands and the south
bound car understood what I meant and he swung to his left and missed me. Then
I stuck my head out of the driver's window and looked back to see what was going
to happen with the Morris car and just then I felt the jolt and I must have hit my
head against the door and it knocked me out. When I came to, my tractor had
jumped the curb on the south side of the road and came to rest with the right front
against a tree and headed east. The trailer had jack-knifed to the left of the tractor.
The Morris car had turned around and was against the southwest corner of the
intersection headed south. At the time, the lady passenger in the Morris car was
pretty well shaken. I do not know whether either Mr. or Mrs. Morris were hurt
beyond the shaking up. Someone called the police but the Westlake police came
out and investigated. He did not prefer any charges or make any arrests. Mr.
Morris asked me, "Why don't you watch what you are doing?" I started to answer
and just then the cop came and said something to the effect of "Watch yourself;
whatever you say can be used against you." So I shut my mouth and didn't say any-
thing. There is an empty lot on the northwest corner of this intersection and just
west of this lot is a service station, and the man on duty there saw the accident. Both
the Morris car and my truck were towed away. I know of no other witnesses who
saw the accident. Mr. Baxter has a lease agreement with the Lake Shore Motor
Freight Company, Girard, Ohio, in which he is compensated on a percentage basis
for hauling steel for them. My salary is also on a percentage basis.
"Have you read the foregoing statement of two pages? Yes.
Is it true to the best of your knowledge and belief? Yes.
"(Signed) George A. Martin, Jr."
Not a word about any brakes.
MR. DAVIS: That doesn't coincide with ours but on the basis of that state-
ment I am perfectly willing to drop the deposition.
MR. WARDER: I would admit that the police have a record showing the
brakes failed. Now, this is the statement Martin gave us (indicating).
MR. DAVIS: From this police statement I read -
THE COURT: Do we have that police statement here? Let's use the precise
language and.maybe we can get a stipulation on it and circumvent the deposition.
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MR. WARDER: I think we have already circumvented the deposition,
haven't we?
THE COURT: In other words, you are willing to stipulate if he were called
to testify he would so testify?
MR. DAVIS: What is the police statement? Let's get that; let's find out.
MR. WARDER: (Reading): "I was travelling west on Detroit approaching
Dover Road; the light was just changing to red; I applied my brakes and they failed
to hold." Isn't that what you had in mind?
MR. DAVIS: Yes. Oh, I am perfectly willing to call up and call off the depo-
sition.
MR. WARDER: But I can tear him apart with this statement.
MR. DAVIS: We don't even know what he would say; we have never seen
the man.
THE COURT: Now, let's see; let's be sure we are clear. How far, Mr.
Warder, are you willing to stipulate; that if George A. Martin were called to testify
he would so testify? And then we will see whether Mr. Davis, whether they will -
MR. WARDER: Oh, on the failure of brakes, absolutely nothing. As I
understand Mr. Davis, he is abandoning that.
MR. DAVIS: I might say to the Court here, that in the pre-trial we are
agreeing to abandon the deposition that was to be taken at Youngstown tomorrow.
THE COURT: I see.
MR. DAVIS: Even if the driver testified as we thought he would, I am not
sure how important it would be in the lawsuit.
THE COURT: So then it is agreed that
MR. WARDER: Look at it (indicating).
MR. DAVIS: I don't doubt your word.
MR. WARDER: I thought you might want to send a copy to your client.
MR. DAVIS: No, I don't think so.
THE COURT: Then the record may show that by agreement the deposition
of George A. Martin, Jr. is called off?
MR. DAVIS: Maybe I better call Baker right away and tell him to cancel it.
THE COURT: All right; we will have a short recess at this time.
(Recess had).
THE COURT: Now, is there anything else from the plaintiff's side that you
would like to propose for stipulation, Mr. Warder?
MR. WARDER: Did we get in that stipulation about the accident occurring
under circumstances that there is probable liability on all defendants in the original
case?
THE COURT: I think Mr. Davis agreed that that is a fact. Is that right,
Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Well, you have got the question there that comes up again
and that is your question of, if Martin and Baxter are employees of the Lake Shore,
under that case there (indicating)
THE COURT: Referring to the Shaver case in the Supreme Court of Ohio.
MR. DAVIS: - but I don't see where it is important to stipulate that at all,
because it doesn't affect this case. We by our agreement and the settlement ad-
mitted liability; that is, I mean at least that we wanted to get it out of the way. I
don't see where that would make any difference, Warder, whether we admit that
or not.
MR. WARDER: No.
THE COURT: Saving the question of materiality, I suppose that what Smith
is really asking us is whether it would be necessary for him to put on proof if he
thinks that becomes important?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: Still reserving your right to object to its materiality would
you stipulate that if it is found to be material by the Court that George A. Martin,
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Jr. and Ford Baxter and Florence Baxter and Lake Shore Motor Freight were
probably liable?
MR. WARDER: To the plaintiffs in the personal injury cases?
THE COURT: To the plaintiffs?
MR. DAVIS: Well, off-hand I can't see where it would do any harm; on
the other hand, I don't see where it does any good. Was Florence Baxter still in
the case when you finally settled it?
MR. WARDER: No, I just included her, included everybody; if you want
to leave her out, leave her out
MR. DAVIS: I would just as soon include her; as far as - the only thing
in what I am interested is whether I want to include the Lake Shore or nor, how-
ever, the Baxters are included.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Warder: When you include Lake
Shore do you do it on the basis of respondeat superior?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: On the basis of the ICC endorsement?
MR. WARDER: No, just on the common law of respondeat superior.
THE COURT: Relationship between Lake Shore and Ford Baxter and George
Martin, Jr.?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, does that make any difference?
MR. DAVIS: That is agreeable to me.
THE COURT: All right. Knowing that is the basis of including Lake Shore
you are then willing to stipulate that? So that the fact is stipulated; the materiality,
however, is reserved for the judgment of the Trial Court.
MR. WARDER: Fair enough.
THE COURT: Now, does that complete the stipulations at this time from
the standpoint of the plaintiff?
MR. WARDER: That is all I want, yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any additional stipulations that you would like
to propose on behalf of the defendant, Great American, Mr. Davis?
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT: Would the parties stipulate that without the necessity of call-
ing Walter F. O'Malley as a witness at the trial of this action, that if he were called
to testify that he would testify as he did in his deposition on January 25, 1956?
MR. WARDER: Yes, I will so stipulate, but I don't want to foreclose my-
self from subpoenaing Mr. O'Malley if something that I don't presently foresee
comes up.
MR. DAVIS: Shall we put it here as we have got it there, to the effect that
the driver of the truck received orders in Cleveland to proceed to Lorain to pick
up some steel to take to Economy, Pennsylvania?
MR. WARDER: I will do better than that; I will stipulate with you that the
deposition of Walter F. O'Malley taken January 25, 1956 may be read in evidence
on trial without further authentication and without filing.
THE COURT: Doesn't that take care of it?
MR. WARDER: How is that?
MR. DAVIS: That is right; that takes care of it. Thank you.
Now, is the contract between Baxter and Lake Shore admitted?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: Is it admitted that George Martin, Jr. was an employee of
Ford Baxter?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS: Well, as far as I can see - and we have admitted the insurance
policy of the Farm Bureau?
THE COURT: Yes.
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MR. DAVIS: I can't think of anything else.
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen. Then that brings us to a discussion of
the issues; we have already touched on those but I think that perhaps at this point
it may be helpful to attempt to clarify our thinking on it a little further.
Mr. Warder, will you state, if you will please, the position of Farm Bureau?
I realize you have set it forth at some length in your petition but I think it may be
helpful if you give us the essence of your position.
MR. WARDER:- Yes. I would like to start with where Mr. Davis left off.
I make no quarrel, that is, between Lake Shore and Baxter - well, no - as be-
tween Lake Shore and Martin, that the liability of Martin is primary and that the
Lake Shore is secondary. Now, I have some doubts about whether, as between
Baxter and Lake Shore, that is the situation, in spite of this case (indicating).
MR. DAVIS: Let me get that first part of it again, Smith; you said that as
between - you admitted what?
MR. WARDER: As between Lake Shore and Martin.
THE COURT: That is Martin, the actual driver?
MR. WARDER: The actual driver; that Martin's liability is primary and
Lake Shore's is secondary. That would also be true as to Baxter; Baxter's liability is
secondary as between Baxter and Martin.
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. WARDER: -No question there.
MR. DAVIS: Baxter and Martin?
MR. WARDER: Yes.' Now, as between Lake Shore and Baxter, I am not
certain of; I realize there is the Shaver case here but I keep going back to the old
loaned servant doctrine, Halkias against Wilkoff;
THE COURT: 141 Ohio State.
MR. WARDER: 140, I think; you may be right.
THE COURT: One of those.
MR. WARDER: And Givonalle against Republic Steel, I think is 153. I
am not too sure of who is primary and who is secondary as to Baxter and Lake
Shore; that is a problem that frankly I had never even thought of until this after-
noon, and I think it is immaterial, for this reason, Mr. Davis: Here is my theory of
this lawsuit.
MR. DAVIS: Pardon me?
MR. WARDER: Here is my theory of this lawsuit: That the Farm-Bureau
policy - let's start with that - the plaintiff's policy insures anyone legally re-
sponsible for the operation of this truck; anybody; that would include Lake Shore,
that would include Baxter, that would include Martin had he been sued, and we
would have had a duty to defend.
Now, by a parity of reasoning, your policy has the same provisions. I think
that Lake Shores's policy affords coverage to Lake Shore, to Baxter and to Martin.
Now, the fact that those various people may as between themselves have had
primary and secondary responsibility seems to me to be a wholly different thing from
saying which is the primary or secondary insurer. Do you follow me on that?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. WARDER: The only authority I know of anywhere in Ohio in what is
a primary and secondary insurer is Trinity Universal vs. General Accident, I think
that is 138; if it is not, try 137; it is one of them. I find I always miss these things
one volume; do you, Judge?
THE COURT: Gee, I am lucky if I come that dose.
MR. WARDER: But that case announces the principle that where one com-
pany insures the risk in general terms, and another company insures a specific risk,
that the specific insurer has the primary coverage. Now, that case involved a
premises liability policy and an automobile policy, and the- automobile carrier con-
tended that there was co-extensive insurance, and the Supreme Court said that is
not right here because this general insurer covers the whole field and he just covers
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this automobile just by happenstance because it happened to be on the premises
when the accident happened, but you have got the specific risk and you were
primarily liable.
Now, we- don't have that situation; we have got two policies, both of which
cover this trip over the road, or any trip over the road with this truck for that matter.
. Now, I think as between the insurance companies it is co-extensive coverage,
and your problem here is not who is primary between Baxter and Lake Shore -
your.problem here is if there be dual coverage as to anybody?
I may not have made myself clear.
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. WARDER: But I think, for instance, if on this petition there is a suit
against Lake Shore Motor Freight, there is a suit against Florence Baxter. I think
if Farm Bureau" had stuck its head in the sand and said "We won't defend anybody,"
I think Great American would have had a -duty to defend them both; and if Great
American had said, "We won't defend any member of this lawsuit," then I think
Farm Bureau has a duty to defend both of them. -
THE COURT.- Now, let's- see if I can just follow that up with one or two
questions. Your present position appears to, if I can speak very directly, appears
to vary slightly from your position in your petition; at least, my understanding is
MR. WARDER: I think it does.
THE COURT: I believe in your petition you take the position that actually
the Farm Bureau policy generally covered this risk and that the Great American
policy specifically covered the risk, and that therefore, there was a primary-secondary
position between the two. Now, that isn't your present proposition?
MR. WARDER: I will maintain that in court, I suppose; I am just talking
along about what I think of the lawsuit, I might as well ask for the whole loaf.
THE COURT: Fair enough.
This second point: if you are correct, if there was dual coverage, then what do
you say with reference to the proportionate risk of the two insurers?
MR. WARDER: Well, there we have got a lot of questions. Mr. Davis
claims that his ICC endorsement limits his liability. I haven't had time to digest that
endorsement as I read it over, I didn't quite see how, assuming that it was even
effective -
MR. DAVIS: Where it didn't limit?
MR. WARDER: Yes.
MR. DAVIS:I thought the first sentence up at the top of 8, the reverse side of
it, would limit (indicating).
MR. WARDER: Well, this other side is a part of it;, it starts out, "As a
motor carrier of passengers or property, with Section 215 of the Interstate Com-
merce Act and the pertinent rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, in consideration of the premium stated in the policy, to which this endorse-
ment is attached, the company hereby agrees to pay within the limits of liability
hereinafter provided, any final judgment recovered against the insured for bodily
injury to or death of any person, or loss of or damage to property of others, exclud-
ing injury to or death of the insured's employees" - I will skip that - "resulting
from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles under cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity or permit issued to the insured by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, or otherwise, in transportation in interstate or
foreign commerce, subject to Part 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act, regardless of
whether such motor vehicles are specifically described in the policy or not."
Now, here we get a knotty question; that only applies, even those limits, to
transportation under the Interstate Commerce Act. I maintain that whatever may
have been the result, once he put on the load and started - that while he is going
to Lorain is not subject to any regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
THE COURT: You mean by that, that he would not have to comply with
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ICC regulations on the way to Lorain but he would have to comply with them after
he had a load?
MR. WARDER: Well, that wouldn't be completely true; of course, I sup-
pose he would have to keep a log under the ICC regulations, he would have to
keep his hours of sleep, but it seems to me, if he goes to Lorain, takes one look at
the load and then says, "Oh, nuts to it; I don't want to haul that" and goes on back
home, he has not violated any provision of the ICC regulation; he had not been
subject to it; he is going from Cleveland to Lorain to pick up a load. Now, the
cases, as I understand it, are, that once the trip is started, even though you do not
cross state lines, but you intend to cross them, you are subject to the Interstate
Commerce Commission authority. Now, this then comes to the narrower point of
when does the trip start?
THE COURT: Let me ask this question; which goes to the next step: Assum-
ing for the moment that the ICC endorsement does cover the operation of this truck
at the time of the collision, then what is the position of Farm Bureau as to the
relative proportion of the risk between the two insurance companies?
MR. WARDER: I am very much afraid that it would be as set forth in that
endorsement, as that is to ten or twenty thousand, as the case may be.
THE COURT: In other words, it would be a fifty-fifty proportion between the
two?
MR. WARDER: That again, now, I want to look at that.
MR. DAVIS: The ICC certificate requires insurance of 10, 20 and 5.
THE COURT: In other words, the same coverage the Farm Bureau had on
the truck?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. WARDER: 10-20 - I am afraid that would be right; freight equip-
ment.
THE COURT: All right. Now, then, Mr. Davis, I think in substance that is
Mr. Warder's position. What is the position the Great American takes?
MR. DAVIS: Well, the Great American's position is this: That the Farm
Bureau, that is, the primary responsibility is on Baxter, the primary coverage, as
between Farm Bureau and Great American, is on the Farm Bureau.
I recognize the argument that Mr. Warder made as to the Farm Bureau being
required to cover the Lake Shore and Baxter, and if the Farm Bureau had refused,
that Great American would have to cover Farm Bureau and Baxter; which raises
that other question; but it seems to me that case I just referred to -
THE COURT: That is the recent -
MR. DAVIS: That is the Shaver -
MR. WARDER: Here is the case (indicating).
MR. DAVIS: That is the case of Shaver vs. Shirks Motor Express Corpora-
tion, 163 O.S. 484, followed by the Thornberry vs. Oler Brothers, Inc., 164 O.S. 395,
seems to place a trucker or a truck owner, who is in the position that Baxter was in
this case, as a servant, and the principles governing respondeat superior would
apply. And in the ultimate event that my ideas are not correct, or not -
THE COURT: Before you go on to your next point, in other words, in sub-
stance, on that point, you say that the insuring allocation of responsibility coincides
with the respondeat superior allocation of responsibility; you say it is the same; is
that your position?
MR. DAVIS: Well, I mean there is a company covering the servant; the truck
owner has the primary coverage; and that applies even though some other insurance
might also cover the trucker, if he didn't have insurance.
THE COURT: I see.
MR. DAVIS: Still as between the companies, the primary obligation is upon
the part of the person covering the servant's truck.
THE COURT: So then your first point is then, that this is entirely Farm
Bureau's party?
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MR. DAVIS: They owe us $9,250.
THE COURT: Then you have a second one?
MR. DAVIS: The second one is this: That if I am wrong in that, then the
ultimate that we would be responsible for would be on the basis of pro rata on
each having 10-20 coverage, which would mean fiftfy-fifty as between the two
companies. I don't think in any event that we are responsible, the Great American's
responsible on the basis of the full amount of the policy as compared to the full
amount of the Farm Bureau policy; that is, I think that the limitation, that the
driver, Baxter, could expect from the Great American Indemnity and the most they
contract for is the provision of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 10-20-5.
MR. WARDER: Let me ask you this, Mr. Davis: Suppose a judgment had
been rendered in this case against Lake Shore Motor Freight for $100,000; do you
think there would have been coverage with Great American?
MR. DAVIS: Why, if the j udgment had been rendered against the Lake
Shore for $100,000 the Great American would have been liable;, there is no question
about that.
MR. WARDER: Wouldn't that answer the whole question?
THE COURT: If that had been true, would you have any rights over?
MR. DAVIS: We would have rights over against Baxter.
THE COURT: To the full extent of the judgment?
MR. DAVIS. I think so.
THE COURT:' And then he in turn could not have collected more than
$20,000 for the two injuries from Farm Bureau?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
MR. WARDER: I think he is getting too much mileage here on the Shaver
case; here, have a look at it, you see, the owner in that case was also the driver;,
the owner in our case was not the driver. Now, they say the owner-driver is pri-
marily responsible. You see, the owner-driver in that Shaver case was the identical
person.
MR. DAVIS: Well, then, I don't see where that - Martin was the employee
of Baxter; there is no question about that.
MR. WARDER: I am going to give you one whing ding of an argument if
you maintain here that Baxter was primarily liable as between Baxter and Lake
Shore.
MR. DAVIS: Oh, we will have to argue about that. I will get a drink of
water.
THE COURT: Sure. We will take a short recess.
(Recess had).
THE COURT: I think we have now reached -
MR. WARDER: I would as soon submit it to your Honor.
MR. DAVIS: We have gone over the whole case; it is just a question of law
there; there is no evidence to be brought in.
MR. WARDER: Maybe he doesn't want that.
MR. DAVIS: I don't think anybody has said anything here that prejudices the
Court one way or the other.
THE COURT: I think this gentlemen: You are faced with this problem - I
certainly think that the case is ready for submission to a trial court, I think that is
perfectly true. I think that our first step should be to have the record transcribed
here of just what has been taken down and be sure that the one exhibit is completed,
and so forth, so that everything is completed, and then at that point it can be sub-
mitted to any trial court. I am, frankly, faced with a problem that here in divorce
court, where I am regularly sitting, it just keeps you going to try to keep your head
above water. We took this one because this had been assigned to us originally, and
therefore, we completed it.
There is a time factor - if you don't care about waiting however long, then
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I would take it; if, on the other hand you want a, decision in the next two, three, four
or five months, then I would suggest that you had better -
MR. DAVIS: It had slipped my mind that I was to complete the exhibit here.
MR. WARDER: Yes, we have one exhibit that isn't complete.
THE COURT: Yes. Why don't we do this: Why don't we complete what
is to be done here and then the question of submitting it to the Court can be de-
cided?
MR. WARDER: Have you got an extra copy of that endorsement?
MR. DAVIS: Of this (indicating)?
MR. WARDER: No, of the endorsement.
MR. DAVIS: Oh, this is here (indicating).
THE COURT: I think, then, gentlemen, we have completed the. general con-
ference portion of the pre-trial; I would be very happy to take a few minutes to
talk separately with each side here, if you care to do that, with reference to whether
or not
MR. DAVIS: We may have one at the office; I will see.
MR. WARDER: I would like to have it; I want to ship it to my client; we have
never seen that until today.
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
THE COURT: I would be very glad, gentlemen - maybe, if that settlement
portion of this pre-trial can't proceed this afternoon
MR. WARDER: I am sorry, Judge.
THE COURT: What I was attempting to say was, we have now reached
that point in the pre-trial where I think that it might very well be profitable to have
a separate discussion with each side looking to the possibility of an amicable adjust-
ment of your controversy, unless you feel that this is the kind of case where you
want to make some earth-shaking law establishing a principle that might conceiva-
bly have some bearing on later cases.
Would you at this time like to indulge in that discussion or would you prefer
to wait until you have had an opportunity to exchange the further exhibits?.
MR. DAVIS: I think, possibly, Judge, we may both be in the same position:
We would have to communicate with our home offices before we could ever talk;
is that right, Smith?
MR. WARDER: I have some limited authority depending on what develops
on your exhibit though. There is no use of my kidding you; we may loosen up a
little bit, depending on what develops in your exhibit.
MR. DAVIS: Don't strain yourself.
THE COURT: We will leave it this way, gentlemen: Let's get that complete
exhibit, and then we will resume settlement discussions, which normally would
occur at this point in the pre-trial.
MR. DAVIS: I will get that exhibit and try to get it inside of a week or such
time, or I will get in touch with the Court.
THE COURT: Then if we can't do any more now -
MR. DAVIS: At least, on the basis of this record we can draw up an agreed
statement of facts and submit it on that.
MR. WARDER: Or just as it is.
THE COURT: Is it agreed that this can be transcribed or not?
MR. WARDER: Oh, sure.
THE COURT: Mr. Davis, there is one further stipulation that you want to
propose; will you state what that is?
MR. DAVIS: We didn't stipulate as to whether attorneys' fees in the Morris
cases should be charged against the losing party in this case or whether both of the
companies will bear their own expense. I agree to this subject to a confirmation by
my company; I agree that each of the companies will bear their own expense.
THE COURT: Irrespective of the outcome of the litigation?
MR. DAVIS: Irrespective of the outcome of this litigation.
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THE COURT. And you, Mr. Warder, agree to that likewise?
MR. WARDER. Yes.
MR. DAVIS: I would like it understood that this is subject to the approval of
my client.
THE COURT. All right.
MR. DAVIS: That is what I recommend to them.
MR. WARDER. But you have no authority for that?
MR. DAVIS: I haven't even asked for it since this thing started.
MR. WARDER. I went ahead and asked for it.
MR. DAVIS: Well, I didn't.
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APPENDIX D - SAMPLE PRE-TJAL ORDERS
I. (An action in mandamus to require a Village Building Commissioner
to issue a Building Permit)
(Attorneys' names and addresses omitted.) March 16, 1955.
In Re: Anthony Juray v. Herbert H. Hackney,
No. 668,995.
Gentlemen:
At the Pre-trial hearing held on March 14, 1955, the following stipulations were
reached and are herewith entered as a Pre-trial order:
1. It is stipulated that Pre-Trial Exhibit 1 is the zoning ordinance of the Village
of Westlake and pertinent and material sections thereof may be proved without the
necessity of further identification or authentication.
2. It is stipulated that the subject premises are zoned for general business as
provided in Article 3, Section 1 and Article 4, Section 3 of Pre-Trial Exhibit 1.
3. It is stipulated that Pre-Trial Exhibit 2 is the application for permit and
certificate of occupancy made by the plaintiffs to the defendant Building Commis-
sioner on January 10, 1955.
4. It is stipulated that Pre-Trial Exhibit 3 is the application for appeal to the
Board of Zoning Appeals made by the plaintiffs on January 19, 1955, and the parties
agree that Pre-Trial Exhibits 2 and 3 shall be treated for purposes of this case as
having been originally filed with the Board of Zoning Appeals and that the pro-
cedure of making the appeal is herewith deemed proper by the parties.
5. It is stipulated that Pre-Trial Exhibit 4 are the plans filed by the plaintiffs
with the defendants with Pre-Trial Exhibits 2 and 3.
6. It is stipulated that in accordance with law a public hearing on Pre-Trial
Exhibits 2 and 3 was held on January 25, 1955, and that Pre-Trial Exhibit 5 is the
entire set of minutes of such public hearing and that it will not be necessary to
further identify or authenticate said minutes; however, all other questions as to
admissibility of all or any portion of said minutes being reserved for the trial court.
7. It is stipulated Pre-Trial Exhibit 6 is a petition containing signatures, that
Pre-Trial Exhibit 7 is a note from C. P. Weaver, that Pre-Trial Exhibit 8 is a letter
from Edward Brown, and Pre-Trial Exhibit 9 is a letter from J. Pitonyak; that said
Pre-Trial Exhibits 6 through 9 are referred to in Pre-Trial Exhibit 5, and that the
stipulations applying to Pre-Trial Exhibit 5 likewise apply to Pre-Trial Exhibits 6
through 9.
Finally it was agreed that the case should be advanced to the head of the trial
list for trial on Monday, March 21, 1955.
Respectfully,
JUDGE WILLIAM K. THOMAS
II. (An action for overtime compensation brought pursuant to
Federal Wages and Hours Law)
(Attorneys, names and addresses omitted.)
April 18, 1955.
In Re: Papp v. Middle Atlantic Transportation,
Inc., No. 641,994.
Gentlemen:
At the pretrial hearing of the above captioned case the following stipulations
were reached and are herewith entered as a pre-trial order.
1. It is stipulated that on or about April 14, 1950, the plaintiff was hired by
the defendant as a tracing clerk at its Cleveland Terminal; and that his rate of com-
pensation was a minimum of $50.00 per week, the hourly rate being $1.00 for pur-
poses of computing overtime above 40 hours.
2. It is the contention of the plaintiff that on or about August 17, 1950, the
plaintiff was assigned the duties of an O.S.D. Clerk, that his pay was raised to
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$65.00 a week at that time, and that in September or October of 1950 it was raised
to $75.00 a week, at which weekly rate plaintiff claims he was paid during the
period covered by his action.
3. It is the claim of the plaintiff that he worked approximately 570 hours of
overtime for which he was not paid the statutory time and a half.
4. It is the defense of the defendant that it is not liable to the plaintiff, as
claimed, on the ground that the plaintiff was in a bona fide executive capacity under
the statutory exemption of Section 13a of the Act. But the defendant says that if
liable, which it denies, it is only liable to the extent of $143.43.
5. It is stipulated that subject to the right of the defendant to object to the
materiality or relevancy thereof Pre-Trial Exhibit 1 is a letter written by the Legal
Department of the defendant, and further that Pre-Trial Exhibit 2 is the O.S. and D.
Procedural Manual, copy of which will be furnished by the defendant to plaintiff
within a week.
6. Plaintiff requests that time cards and pay records from October 1950 through
May 1951 be available for inspection of his counsel and for production at trial.
Defendant consents and will have them available for inspection at the office of its
counsel.
Respectfully,
JUDGE WLIAM K. THOMAS
III. (An action for damages for personal injuries under the
Federal Employers Liability Act)
(Attorneys, names and addresses omitted.)
January 17, 1955.
In Re: Arthur W. Ross v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, No. 664,989.
Gentlemen:
At the recent pre-trial conference the following stipulations and agreements were
reached and are entered herewith as a pre-trial order.
1. It is stipulated that plaintiff suffered a fall from the cupola or cocdoft onto
the floor of the caboose in which he was riding as a conductor, said fall being by
reason of an emergency stop. Said incident occurred on July 27, 1952, when the
freight train of which he was conductor had reached a point near Salineville, Ohio.
2. The defendant agrees to investigate the cause of the emergency stop and to
report its findings to counsel for plaintiff within two weeks from the date of this
letter.
3. Plaintiff and defendant agree to exchange the following information:
(a) Plaintiff will produce all x-ray reports and medical reports of plaintiff to
defendant.
(b) Plaintiff will be available for the taking of his deposition at the mutual
convenience of all concerned.
(c) Defendant will make available for plaintiff plaintiff's payroll records be-
ginning July 15, 1951 to the end of his employment.
(d) Defendant will furnish plaintiff with a copy of all medical examinations
of plaintiff made by Pennsylvania Railroad Doctors beginning July 27,
1952, to date, made in the course of plaintiff's employment, but not in-
cluding reports of expert medical witnesses who have examined plaintiff
in connection with this lawsuit.
Plaintiff also indicated a desire to take depositions of crew members of subject
trains.
When both sides have secured the information needed for trial, the Court will
be informed and the case will be set for trial.
Respectfully,
JUDGE WILLiAm K. THOMAS
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IV. (Pre-Trial Stipulation)
(Caption o-itted.)
It is hereby stipulated between the parties that the defendant, sometime prior to
February 27, 1953, had driven a stake in the tree lawn on the north side of Whit-
tington Drive, Parma, Ohio; that said stake was located approximately seventy-five
(75) feet west of the northwest corner of Whittington Drive and Ridge Road and
was approximately five feet north of the curb line on Whittington Drive.
It is further stipulated between the parties that said stake was removed from th
tree lawn by the defendant within one to three days prior to February 27, 1953.
A. H. DUDNIK
Plaintiff's Attorney
SQUIE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
Defendant's Attorney
Before Judge Daniel H. Wasserman.
(In this action for personal injuries the plaintiff claims that on February 27,
1953, while making a step backwards the heel of her left shoe entered the said hole,
causing the heel to be torn from her shoe, and wrenching, twisting and injuring her.)
APPENDIX E - SAMPLE PRE-TRUAL CHECK SHEETS
PRE-TRIAL CHECK SHEET - NEGLIGENCE ACTION
Part One - The Issues
I. Liability.
A. By questioning develop the respective claims and positions of the parties.
B. Examine any Police Reports as an aid to understanding and narrowing issues.
C. Can stipulations be reached on any of the following subjects, reserving for trial
if desired the admissibility of any stipulated facts?
1. Measurements and composition of street or highway, sidewalk, building, stair
way, floor, or other structure or surface involved.
..............................................................
..............................................................
2. Existence and lawful nature of traffic lights, lane markings, stop signs, or othe!
traffic signals.
..............................................................
3 Weather conditions as shown by official weather reports.
4. Admissibility or at least the authenticity of photographs, engineering diagrams
and other real evidence. (Mark exhibits PT1, PT2, etc.)
..............................................................
..............................................................
5. Validity and effectiveness of any recited municipal ordinances or administrative
regulations; pleas of guilty to traffic law violations.
..............................................................
6. Any lease, deed, contract or other written document which may become rele-
vant at the trial. (Mark with PT exhibit numbers.)
................----------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------
7. Capacity of plaintiff or defendant to sue or be sued as executor or adminis-
trator or as corporation, etc., admissibility of letters of appointment; dea,
certificate; coroner's protocol.
................---------------------------------------------
................---------------------------------------------
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The above and foregoing stipulations, reached at Pre-trial, are herewith ac-
cepted and agreed to in accordance with the Pre-trial Rule of this Court.
Counsel for Plaintiff
Pre-trial Judge
Counsel for Defendant
8. Extent and reasonable value of damage to motor vehicles. (Statements or
estimates of repair to be marked as PT exhibits if necessary).
9. If action is brought by subrogee jointly or individually, agreement and any
other document of subrogation.
10. Any matter not covered above.
D. Can there be admissions on any of the specific claims or ultimate issues relat-
ing to the issue of liability? (e.g. negligence, agency, any defensive claim).
B. Additional Space for Expansion of Any Previous Item.
The above and foregoing stipulations, reached at Pie-trial, are herewith accepted
and agreed to in accordance with the Pie-trial Rule of this Court.
Counsel for Plaintiff
Pre-trial Judge
Counsel for Defendant
II. Damages.
A. By questioning develop the claims and positions of the parties relative to as-
serted injuries and any other elements of damages alleged.
B. Examine respective medical reports, and hospital summaries if available. Also
attempt to get counsel to either (a) agree to exchange copies of medical re-
ports, (b) visually examine the reports of the other party at pre-trial or (c)
consent to reading out loud all or significant portions of medical reports.
C. Obtain a recital of special damages.
D. Can stipulations be reached on any of the following subjects, reserving the
admissibility of any such stipulations for trial?
1. Authenticity of photosatic copies of hospital records pursuant to Pre-trial Rule.
2. Reasonable value of medical, hospital and/or nursing services.
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3. Wages or earnings lost.
4. Reasonable value of repairs or depreciation to damaged motor vehide or other
personal property.
5. Any other items of special damages.
The above and foregoing stipulations, reached at Pre-trial, are herewith accepted
and agreed to in accordance with the Pre-trial Rule of this Court.
Counsel for Plaintiff
Pre-trial Judge
Counsel for Defendant
III. Pleadings and Intermediate Matters.
A. Will any amended pleadings be filed, or amendments interlined in the plead-
ings, or any further pleadings filed?
..............................................................
B. Can any of the pleadings be simplified (e.g. can any of the spetifications of
negligence be merged or withdrawn) ?
..............................................................
C. What are the specific issues or questions of fact or law to be decided?
D. Are there any depositions to be taken, or interrogatories to be answered, or
any other steps of discovery to be accomplished?
E. Is a physical examination requested?
F. Will a jury be waived? If not, how large will the jury be?
G. What things are to be done before the next Pre-trial, if another is necessary?
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The above and foregoing stipulations, reached at Pre-trial, are herewith accepted
and agreed to in accordance with the Pre-trial Rule of this Count.
Counsel for Plaintiff
Pre-trial Judge
Counsel for Defendant
Part Two - Settlement Discussion
Memorandum of discussions held separately with each side, to be kept by the
Pre-trial Judge, and not to be filed as papers in the case.
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS - DEPARTMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Referral and Report on Pre-trial
Case No. --------------- Name
Date ----------- Referred to Department of Domestic Relations by
Judge
In name of In name of
CAPITAL ASSETS: HUSBAND WIFE
Real estate -------------------------- $----------$
Household goods---------------------
Automobile
Bank accounts-
Stocks, bonds, etc.
Insurance
INCOME:
Husband................................................
Wife ---------------------------------------------------
INDEBTEDNESS:
Husband
Wife
ARREARS ON PENDENTE LITE SUPPORT:
LEGAL EXPENSE:
PLEADINGS AND PROCEDURE:
The above and foregoing stipulations, and any appearing on
hereof are hereby approved.
fhe reverse side
Plaintiff
Defendant
---------------------------------------------------------
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